The Diary of a Napoleonic Foot Soldier

May27 by Dave Mathwin

History comes to us in many forms. Most historians try and make sense of their time directly, or perhaps try and understand their time through understanding the past. In his diary, Jakob Walter only seeks to relate his own experience. He doesn’t even really attempt to understand his experience in context. He has no comments on Napoleon and his policies, wars, and treaties. His field of vision concerned himself only.

This certainly does not make Walter a selfish man, or even a narrow one automatically. Walter came from Germany, an area conquered by Napoleon probably around 1807. When his army got pressed into Napoleon’s service, his main concern became hoping that he and his brother (also a soldier for Napoleon) would stay alive. He likely cared nothing for Napoleon himself or any grand moral or political scheme Napoleon may have had. It was not his war.

So his narrow focus has no moral overtones necessarily, but this narrow vision of Walter’s writing has occasional parallels in his actions. We know the invasion of Russia made for a hellish retreat for Napoleon’s army. Walter lets us know that even in the initial months of advance into Russia supplies were scanty, at least for the “allied troops” like Walter. This meant foraging, which the Russians made difficult by hiding and burning their own supplies. Walter writes,

If they had voluntarily removed the simple covers [of their storage areas] much of their household furniture would have remained unspoiled. For it was necessary to raise the floors and the beams in order to find anything, and to turn upside down anything that was covered.

Walter may have cared somewhat for Russians, but his argument boils down to, “If only they wouldn’t hide their food we wouldn’t have to destroy their homes to find it.” He doesn’t concern himself at all about the larger picture, only the practical aspects of staying alive. Limiting oneself to purely “practical” concerns will likely have moral consequences.

Most anyone with a vague familiarity of the Russian campaign will know of the terrible retreat. Walter’s details of Napoelon’s withdraw bring out the ghastly nature of his experience. All semblance of unity and order broke down in the quest to stay alive. I remember years ago reading Elie Weisel’s Night, a great book that should be read, but one I never wish to read again. What made Weisel’s experience so tragic and terrible for me was not just the inhumanity of the Nazi’s. Instead, Weisel’s descriptions of how the prisoners often turned on each other for bread or “good” jobs really devastated me. Perhaps, I thought, had the prisoners united against the Nazi’s they could have redeemed the situation to some degree, but in Weisel’s account they rarely, if ever, did this. Obviously the retreat from Russia is not the same thing, yet I was reminded of Night when reading how Napoleon’s army turned on each other, stealing food and horses from their comrades in arms with no hesitations. Hobbes might say that this is what happens to human nature when the veneer of civilization gets stripped away.

While Walter had a narrow vision some larger aspects of Napoleon’s empire reveal themselves. The FrenchRevolution proclaimed “The Rights of Man,” at least in theory. In practice it tended to mean rights for those who agreed with the Revolution’s shifting meaning of what it meant to be French particularly, not human generally. After Robespierre’s execution much of this petered out, and Napoleon helped end it. But though Napoleon was in some ways an ambassador of the French Revolution’s ideals of universal equality, the “French” emphasis made itself evident. Whatever supplies Napoleon could muster from headquarters went first to French troops (especially his Imperial Guard), then to the “Allied” troops. In the Russian campaign, supplies were scarce enough that there was never a “then” at all. The sham flimsiness of Napoleon’s alliance gets indirectly exposed in Walter’s account. That many of the “allies” Napoleon fought with in Russia in 1812 would turn on him in 1813 makes perfect sense.

So perhaps sometimes narrow keyholes can open up a vision of broader vistas.

Napoleon on Napoleon

May27 by Dave Mathwin

Those who find themselves ill-disposed towards Napoleon (as I am on balance) should avoid reading the 25 page introduction of his abridged autobiography. With crackling prose Napoleon gives us

An explanation of the success of his siege of Toulon
A concise theory of his rules of war
A demonstration of how Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, . . . and he himself . . . all followed these rules (he also makes sure to say how he fought in more campaigns and battles than many of those he lists).
An outline of recent French campaigns that failed to adhere to these rules and failed . . . neither of which directly involved him in any way (other generals made the mistakes).
An explanation of Charles XII failed invasion of Russia, told with no irony or self-awareness whatsoever.
A comparison of his wars and the wars of Louis XIV, in which he shows that the Sun-King’s wars did far more damage to France, and had far less legality, than his own campaigns (some estimates place French casualties in the Napoleonic Wars at around 1 million).

Such audacity and restless energy is hard to comprehend and one can’t help but admire it at least on some level. He is the consummate NYC cab driver. If this is the man in exile at the end of his life (when he wrote his memoirs, ca. 1816-17), imagine how many secretaries he drove insane in 1805. His meteoric rise to power makes perfect sense in those first 25 pages. But for those who wish to dislike Napoleon, fear not! Simply read a bit further and one grows weary of such energy, audacity, and his utter and complete moral blindness. You begin to understand not just his ascension to power, but why he alienated almost everyone close to him and why those characteristics would inevitably carry him too far.

Napoleon shows his best side when discussing practical matters of policy. In the beginning of his career at least he showed a keen political sense. He criticism of the Assembly in the days preceding the Terror ring true:

[The Assembly] committed two errors, which might have produced the total ruin of the nation. The first was to establish a Constitution at odds with the experience of all ages, whose mechanism contrived to restrict public power [during a time of uncertainty]. Great as this error was, it was less fragrant and had less deplorable consequences than the second — that or persisting in re-establishing Louis XVI on the throne after his flight to Varennes. It ought to have sent commissioners to Varennes not to bring the king back to Paris, but to clear the way for him to abdicate; to have proclaimed Louis XVII king, and to have created a regency, to a princess of the House of Conde and a regency council composed of principal members of the Assembly.

Later he shows the same clarity in his analysis of the controversy between the Jacobins and Girondins (though also a touch of ruthless practicality):

The factions of the Girondins and the Mountain [Jacobins] were too violent in their mutual animosity. Had they both continued to exist, impediments to the administration of government would have multiplied and France would not have been able to maintain her territory in the face of all Europe. The good of the country required the triumph of one of those parties. . . . Would the result have been the same had it been the Girondin party that gained the day and the Mountain sacrificed? I think not. The mountain party, although checked, would always have possessed great influence, in the popular societies and armies. There was undoubtedly more talented and better men in the Girondin, but the Girondins had more speculative men, less resolute and less decisive.

Though this kind of analysis has its darker side (many worthy Girondins lost their lives unjustly in the Terror), Napoleon at least writes convincingly in these sections. In his campaigns he insisted on a strict unity of command and clear lines of communication at all times. His armies marched with great speed and yet avoided confusion in the ranks. So too, his political analysis and his prose have the same distinguishing marks. He maintains fidelity to his emphasis on practical results and his love of the simplicity of power. He never leaves any doubt as to what he means to say. This is a man soldiers would instinctively respect, a man easy to follow. All such a man would need is an opening, and the French Revolution provided many such openings for Napoleon.

Napoleon has his charms, to be sure, and should not be regarded as a vicious monster. But his ego led him to make almost absurd claims about his career. Even a massively abridged version of his autobiography (in this case, 275 pages as compared to about 1200), even a very sympathetic editor, cannot hide this. Nothing is his fault, and everything has an explanation. The fall of Cairo goes on Kleber’s shoulders, the murder of the Duke of Engheim was England’s fault, and so on, and so on. “I never committed crimes,” he writes.

I reached the summit of greatness by direct paths, without ever having committed an act that morality could reproach. In that respect my rise is unparalleled in history — in order to reign, David destroyed the house of Saul, his benefactor;* Caesar kindled a civil war and overthrew the government of his country; Cromwell caused his master to perish on the scaffold. I was a stranger to the crimes of the Revolution.

We may assume that by “morality” he means “political morality,” and not personal morality, for which he seemingly cared nothing. But even so, what of the death of the Duke of Engheim? His murder irrevocably turned Europe’s aristocracy against him. It turned Tolstoy against him, years later. Even Napoleon’s exceedingly practical Chief of Police, Joseph Fouche, said of the Duke’s execution, “It was worse than a crime. It was a mistake.”**

Explaining away the Russian disaster no doubt called upon all of Napoleon’s skills. He first argues that, “If Moscow had not been burnt [most all agree the French army did not do this], Alexander would have been compelled to make peace.” But he offers no argument as to why, and I at least can’t see why the czar would make peace. Whatever the case, Moscow burned, and a practical man like Napoleon should cease wondering why.

The cold of the Russian winter was “premature,” leading Napoleon to admit that, ok, I “remained in Moscow four days too long.” I believe that this is the only place where Napoleon admits to a mistake. It seems unlikely that the disintegration of an army 1/2 million men strong could rest entirely on this mistake alone. And indeed,

When the army was within two days march of Vilna, and no further dangers threatened it, I conceived that the urgency of affairs required my presence in Paris — only there could I dictate to Prussia and Austria. Had I delayed the passage might have been closed against me. . . . The [Imperial] Guard was then entire and the army contained more than 80,000 combatants . . . The Russian army did not now exceed 50,000 men. [Supplies] abounded at Vilna. Considerable stores of clothing and ammunition had likewise been established. Had I remained with the army . . . it would never have retreated beyond Vilna. . . . It is from this period in particular that the great losses of the campaign may be dated. Nothing was, or could have been more totally unforeseen by me than the senseless conduct adopted at Vilna.

Again, just as in Egypt, he, being a good father, left his children with every opportunity of success. Leave it to his prodigal subordinates to ruin everything.

But still, Napoleon had and has his devotees. You can see the blinding effect of Napoleon’s ego even on the editor of this abridged version of his memoirs, Somerset de Chair. Chair writes regarding Napoleon’s recounting of the Moscow campaign,

Almost all historians have treated the Russian campaign as a unmitigated disaster. Here Napoleon sets the record straight. After defeating Russia at Borodin . . . Napoleon withdrew. He experienced devastating weather conditions, but this does not alter Napoleon’s claim to have achieved what he set out to do. [He sought] to teach Russia a lesson not to interfere in French affairs in the future when his son should become Emperor and to punish the Tsar for opening his ports to Britain. [Napoleon’s] view that he left a defeated and humiliated Russia in his wake is hard to ignore. It was, admittedly, a harassed return . . . it was not as if the French had intended to occupy Russia indefinitely. If Hitler had succeeded [in Russia], where Napoleon did not ever intend to remain, it would have been a very different story.

I think we can agree with Chair that yes, Napoleon was not as bad as Hitler. Score a point for hero-worship if you wish. But to suggest that Napoleon achieved his aims in Russia by preventing Russia from challenging his son and heir is a gross absurdity. His failure in Russia directly led to his first abdication and the impossibility of his son ever succeeding him, and led also to the rise (not humiliation) of Russia an an expansive, imperial power in the 19th century.

Napoleon’s life can be viewed as tragic even if we don’t call him a tragic hero. Many of Napoleon’s top generals abandoned him and defected to the Bourbons. This must have been a bewildering and devastating blow. But I think that such men simply learned from their master that when a situation warrants it, find a way to survive. For Napoleon, even on St. Helena, his memoirs stand as his final battle, his last attempt to conquer. For me at least, his autobiography has a minor appeal as a kind of grand, doomed adventure — like that of Waterloo. And they must fail, that Napoleon might possibly learn humility.***

Dave

*Certainly not true from any glance at 1 Samuel – 1 Kings.

**Some believe that Talleyrand said this instead. Whoever said it, the difference is the same. Both men devoted themselves to Napoleon’s practical morality and they saw the consequences of such an “ill-considered” action.

***Towards the end of the memoirs he blames the allies for violating the Treaty of Fontanblieu and sending him to St. Helena. Again, he is either joking or willfully blind. He tore up that treaty when he escaped from Elba.

Still, there is some evidence at the very end of his life he may have had a genuine religious awakening.

Napoleon Dynamite

May20 by Dave Mathwin

The statistical revolution has transformed how we watch and evaluate baseball, and has made similar inroads into basketball as well. Granted, this has its benefits, but one important downside for all of this is that it ends all of the fun arguments about who is the better player, and so on. With the advent of WAR (wins above replacement player value) we can’t even argue about what is the best statistic to use in player evaluations.

The Roman historian Livy includes a great vignette from the 2nd Punic War between Hannibal and Scipio, with Scipio beginning:

When Africanus asked who, in Hannibal’s opinion, was the greatest general, Hannibal named Alexander… as to whom he would rank second, Hannibal selected Pyrrhus…asking whom Hannibal considered third, he named himself without hesitation. Then Scipio broke into a laugh and said, “What would you say if you had defeated me?

But alas, some of these quips may no longer be possible, thanks to the statistical revolution. A brilliant fellow named Ethan Arsht has used statistics to rank many of the great generals of all-time. He admits that he intends his findings to spark fun debate and not be the final word, but it is impressive all the same. He explains his methodology, and you can check out the full interactive rankings here.

Arsht has many surprises for us, some of which confirm my own thoughts (I have always thought R.E. Lee overrated by most, and Grant underrated by most), some that dramatically challenge them (George McClellan has a higher WAR than Lee–have at it Civil War buffs). But perhaps the starkest shock to my own thoughts is that his model ranks Napoleon Bonaparte as history’s greatest general by a very, very wide margin.

This would surprise no one who lived in the 19th century or perhaps the early 20th. Recently, however, some have challenged the traditional adoration of Napoleon and focused on his debacles in Egypt and Russia, and the fact that he lost in the end. When he started to face reformed and refitted armies, and better leaders, from 1809 onward, his fortunes changed dramatically. My own bias often leans towards challenging prevailing opinion, and I ate this up. But the study has challenged me to reexamine Napoleon and perhaps discover that (horror of horrors) received opinion has always been correct about him.

For my rethinking of Napoleon I turned to Harold Parker’s Three Napoleonic Battles. His premise intrigued me in that he proposed to look at different battles at different points in Napoleon’s career and see what, if anything, changed about his abilities over time. He first shows Napoleon at the peak of his powers against a weak general at the Battle of Friedland. Then, at Aspern-Essling about two years later, his abilities seem to wane as he faces a decent opposing commander within a trickier geography. Finally, we see Napoleon defeated at Waterloo by an excellent opposing commander in Wellington.

Even for those like myself who tend not to like Napoleon, one cannot deny the dash, charm, and incisive brilliance of the man, and all this is on full display at Friedland in June of 1807. At Eylau months previously, Napoleon failed to get a decisive victory over Russia. He got it here.

The battle began and the Russian General Bennigsen noticed a seemingly somewhat isolated French corp commanded by Marshal Lannes. Likely Bennigsen never intended to engage the French, for to do so he would need to cross the river Alle. Still, it looked inviting enough for Bennigsen–he need not engage the whole of the French army, but merely wound it with a quick excursion against a weaker force.

Herein perhaps lies a lesson of leadership: great generals can make great things out of the unexpected, but average to poor leaders need to stay on script to achieve anything at all.

Lannes held remarkably well, and Benningsen, having put his hand to plow, did not want to pull back, assuming that victory was just a few more committed troops away. He pushed more troops over the Alle, but in so doing, put the Russians in a tight spot of having their backs to the river. Time, however, was not on his side. Lannes sent messengers to Napoleon asking him to come with all haste, and if French reinforcements could arrive in time–and the French marched very fast for their day–Russia’s numerical advantage would disappear.*

True to his sanguine spirit and quick mind, Napoleon minded not at all the surprise of the Russian attack, and saw great opportunity in it. He had the knack, too, for creating memorable vignettes of speech, such as the following as he rode hard to the battlefield:

Do you have a good memory?
Passable, sire.
Well, do you know what anniversary is today, June 14?
That of Marengo.
Yes, yes, that of Marengo–and I shall beat the Russians just as a I beat the Austrians.

Below is a map of the field at Friedland

Napoleon arrived on the field of battle, and my impression is that he gave the following orders after perhaps one to two hours of personal reconnaissance of the field.

Marshal Ney will take the right, from Sortlack to Posthenen, and he will bear to the present position of General Oudinot. Marshal Lannes will have the center, which will begin at the left of Marshal Ney from the village of Posthenen to Henrichsdorf.
The grenadiers of Oudinot, which at present form the right of Marshal Lannes, will by slow degrees bear to the left, in order to attract the attention of the enemy to themselves.
The left will be formed by Marshal Motlier, holding Henrichsdorff and the the road to Konigsberg, and and from there extending across the front of the Russian right wing. Marshal Mortier will never advance, the movement is to be made by our right which will pivot on our left.
The cavalry of General Espagne and the dragoons of General Grouchy, joined with the cavalry of the left wing, will maneuver to do the most harm to the enemy when the latter, pressed by the vigorous attack of our right, will find it necessary to retreat.
General Victor and the infantry and cavalry of the Imperial Guard will form the reserve and will be placed in Grunhof, Bothkeim, and behind Posthenen. I shall be with the reserve.
One should always advance by the right, and one should leave the initiative to Marshal Ney, who will await my orders to begin.
From the moment that the right advances on the enemy, all the cannon of the line must double their fire in a useful direction to protect the attack of the wing.

All of Napoleon’s brilliance is here–the energy of the prose, the clarity of the orders, and the strategic overlay of the entire battle are all present. Bennigsen and the Russians fought hard. But seeing Napoleon’s mental command of the situation in the above orders, it surprises us not that he gained a decisive victory and brought (for a time) the Russians in line with his empire as a result.

Parker then forwards to the Battle of Aspern-Essling, where Napoleon faced a better commander a few years later, in a more confusing situation. Here too, the geography was more difficult, and the river (the Danube), more formidable:

By this time Napoleon had occupied Vienna and controlled much of the Austrian empire, but still had not destroyed the Austrian army in the field. The Archduke Charles led the Austrians, and most rate him as a thorough and competent tactician not likely to make mistakes, but lacking in strategic vision. Napoleon sought to destroy the Austrians, but as you can see from the map above, a competent commander could make that difficult given that Napoleon was in enemy territory with problematic geography.

The battle was confusing and lacked the decisive clarity Napoleon so desired. He needed good bridges over the Danube to concentrate his forces in Lobau, but the Danube, and the Austrians, had no intention of making it easy on them. At Friedland Napoleon assumes the air of absolute mastery, but here he pleads with fate rather than commanding it. A sample of some of his orders:

The interruption of the bridge has prevented us from receiving supplies; at 10:00 we ran out of munitions. The enemy perceived this and has done us great damage. In this state of affairs, to repair the bridges, to send us munitions and food, to keep an eye on Vienna, is extremely important. Write to the Prince of Ponte-Corvo . . . that he may draw toward us.

Here we are far from the Napoleon of Friedland, a commander who seems helpless, who needs reinforcements, who has no direct command of the action.

The Austrians were thus able to pound some French detachments for hours with no threat of retaliation due to their lack of ammunition. Many of the French naturally wanted to withdraw. Napoleon had not badly blundered–the field was confusing, and he had been somewhat unlucky with the bridges. While he lacked tactical clarity in the battle’s first stages, he managed to demonstrate his trademark strategic clarity in his response to his men’s request for withdrawal.

“You wish,” he said to [his field marshals] “to recross the Danube! And how? Are not the bridges destroyed? Without that, would we not be united as victors? We can, it is true, have the men and horses cross on boats; but what will become of the artillery? Shall we abandon our wounded? Shall we say thus to the enemy, and to Europe, that the victors today are vanquished? And if the Archduke, more puffed up by our retreat than by his earlier, pretended success, crosses the Danube behind us at Tulln, at Krems, and Lintz . . . if he brings together his different corp . . . where shall we retire? Will it be to the positions I have intrenched on the Traun, on the Inn, or the Lech? . . . . No! we must run as far as the Rhine; for those allies which victory and fortune have given us, an apparent defeat will take from us and even turn against us. We must remain [in the Lobau]. We must threaten an enemy accustomed to fearing us and keep him before us. Before he has made up his mind, before he has begun to act, we will repair the bridges in a manner to defy all accident, the corp will be able to unite and fight on either bank. The army of Italy, followed by that of Lefebvre, will bring us aid. . . . Then we shall be masters of our operations.

It worked. Parker quotes from Marshal Massena, who commented, “That’s true, that’s right! Yes, the Danube alone has conquered us so far, and not the Archduke!” The French managed to turn the tide the next day enough to allow a complete withdrawal in greater safety for the entirety of their army. The battle belonged to the Austrians, but the Archduke–quite capable in a limited tactical situation–failed strategically in the aftermath. They did not follow-up appropriately. Given this breathing space, the French dealt more decisively with the Austrians later at Wagram.

In the quote above, Napoleon showed that

He did not foolishly underrate his opponent the Archduke
He framed the issue in larger strategic terms
He focused on the problems the river had caused, not the Austrians or their own failures.
He summed up their overall strategic situation in Europe honestly and accurately, as it related to their allies.

So, at Aspern-Essling one could say that Napoleon either bit off more than he could chew, or waded into a situation he failed to fully grasp immediately, as he did at Friedland. Still, his energy and sense of the moment remain with him.

For his third battle Parker examines Waterloo. So many have written so much about this battle that neither he or I have much to say about it. What seems clear to almost every observer is

Napoleon’s health had declined markedly and he was no longer the same in the field (though obviously still a very good general).
At Waterloo he faced a top notch opponent in Wellington, who had sound tactical and strategic sense, had defeated the French in Spain, and had superlatively defensive capability.
While Napoleon showed hints of his former self in moments, he showed little of his usual tactical brilliance, relying on frontal assaults against entrenched positions.

Sir Edward Creasy ranked Waterloo as one of the 15 decisive battles of all-time. His account of the battle is worth reading, but his sense of the importance of the battle fails to convince. Napoleon’s own words make this evident. Quoting from his comments at Aspern-Essling again,

. . . for those allies which victory and fortune have given us, an apparent defeat will take from us and even turn against us. We must remain [in the Lobau].

At Aspern-Essling his clarity about his overall grand strategical situation led to his remaining on the field. It was the right call, for he was correct about the nature of his allies. Events with Russia and Austria proved him right. I can appreciate Arsht and Parker for helping me to see Napoleon with new eyes. Napoleon was a brilliant tactician, and an excellent strategist. My push-back to Arsht would be Napoleon’s failure in grand strategy. I suppose no one can do everything. But, Napoleon’s victories never really created anything lasting for France, for it would all go away after a significant defeat, as it did after Russia in 1812, as it did after Waterloo in 1815. But even if he won at Waterloo, he would have faced similar circumstances soon thereafter, and then again, and again.

Not even the best should burden themselves with being perfect, and if they do, maybe this should be held against them.

Dave

*It seems obvious in hindsight that Bennigsen should have withdrawn back across the river when his initial attack failed. There is even the chance that he could have lured the French to counter-attack him, and he would then be in the advantageous position of defending a bridgehead. But the history of human nature shows that this is psychologically very difficult to do–akin to an act of great repentance.

Ritual, Politics, and Power

May13 by Dave Mathwin

This post was originally written in 2017 . . .

*****************************************

President Reagan garnered political popularity and power in part by his skillful use of political theater and imagery.

But in 1985 even this great master of ritual and belief stumbled a bit with the infamous “Bitburg” affair. A New York Times article read,

It was a day Ronald Reagan had dreaded, even though it was a rite he felt bound to endure. Walking beside Chancellor Kohl amidst the German military graves of the Bitburg cemetery, he looked stiff and uncomfortable, in awkward contrast to his usual ease. While Kohl brushed aside tears, Reagan looked straight ahead, careful not to glance down at the graves less he spy the SS symbols sprinkled across the cemetery lawn. In spite of the West German’s desire to clasp hands over the graves of the war dead, the President’s arms remained resolutely at his side. Earlier in the day, at a hastily arranged ceremony at the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, Reagan laid a wreath inscribed, “From the People of the United States.” At the cemetery, in a ceremony that he was able to limit to just eight minutes, the wreath bore a somewhat different message: “From the President of the United States.”

Reagan got himself into this mess through a series of awkward political circumstances. First, West Germany had emerged as a crucial ally in the Cold War and Reagan wanted to put a new kind of missile on West German soil. Second, Chancellor Kohl had engaged in a long campaign of rehabilitation for Germany, and argued that the German people were also the victims of the Nazi regime–a statement most found (and I find) partially true but mostly false. Still, things in West Germany had obviously changed since the 1940’s. Still, rehabilitating the Nazi regime . . . ?

Most world leaders balked at any ceremonial recognition. Reagan felt that he needed to acknowledge West Germany’s emerging role and commitment to freedom. Plus, the missiles . . . he needed enough political capital with the West Germans to install them on their soil.

So, he decided to go. He asked that the ceremony be limited in time, pomp, and circumstance. He asked his aides to pick a spot that would incur the least amount of political damage. Somehow, in a gaffe of gaffes, his aides picked a spot that included graves of SS officers! One might understand mourning the ordinary German soldier, but not even Reagan could pull this off. Still, Reagan had pledged–but he then insisted on another visit to the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp in last-ditch attempt to balance things out. Hence, his stiff posture at the Bitburg cemetery, and the different messages on the wreaths.

The amount of controversy these simple and subtle gestures caused shows us that such gestures are not that simple. Rituals reflect deeply held beliefs. More than that, rituals create beliefs that stick in the minds of men.

David Kertzer’s Ritual, Politics, and Power discusses this topic brilliantly. He writes about weighty topics like ritual, psychology, and sociology with a spring in his step, and shares numerous revealing examples across time and space. By far, his is the best book I have seen on the subject.

Some of us of a more rationalistic bent might say that rituals have no meaning in themselves. Perhaps they give outward expression to inward meaning, but certainly cannot create meaning. Meaning and ritual can easily part ways.

But how far could one take the separation of meaning and ritual? Imagine we felt respect for someone but failed to shake their hand. Would we really have this respect? Some might say, “We love each other and we don’t need the state or the church to tell us that we’re married.” But I doubt that such people would refuse the “act of marriage” that creates intimacy in the first place. “That’s ok, it’s the thought that counts” would not work as a defense. Without a physical embodiment of the thought, no evidence of the thought exists. More than that, our thoughts cannot be said to conform to reality without a physical manifestation of them. We know a tree by its fruits.

In the Socratic dialogue Phaedo, Socrates argues about the nature of reality. He comments,

Is their true nature contemplated by means of the body? Is it not rather the case that he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true essence of each thing that he examines would come nearest to the knowledge of it?” “Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in any of the other senses along with his thinking, but who employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companionship disturbs the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom? Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?”

In On the Celestial Hierarchy, St. Dionysius the Areopagite acknowledges that human beings cannot immediately or directly attain to spiritual contemplation. Being flesh and blood, we require visible symbols and embodiments to know truth. Kertzer in turn acknowledges that the president mainly functions as, “the chief symbol maker of the land,” so the minute analysis of Reagan’s gestures should not surprise us.* Kertzer quotes another scholar who similarly wrote, “Most political controversy centers around which myth to apply to a particular problem.”

Kertzer generally ignores religion in his book, but the thin line between religion and politics makes itself perfectly obvious throughout his work–a huge strength in my view. It illumines the fact that our political commitments come very near, or equivalent to, our religious beliefs, consciously or otherwise. One immediately thinks of the vesting of clergy to perform religious rites. We should not be gnostics. You cannot just “think” yourself into being married. Even today we still understand that you need a rite, you need “the act of marriage” to create marriage. We know of the crown, robes, and mitres of kings. But even in our much more casual modern American democracy, we have fixed expectations of how to look presidential. To take one example, presidents give the pens they use to sign laws and treaties to favored confidantes or privileged citizens as “sacred” tokens of leadership.

Some may recall how Jimmy Carter’s popularity fell at least in part due to his failure to manage the symbolic nature of his leadership, either in his dress, relationship with Congress, or his tone of voice when speaking. To take an opposite case, Kertzer shows how Rajiv Ghandi skillfully managed the symbolism of his mother Indira’s funeral to make a political career from nothing to India’s youngest Prime Minister in a matter of months.

We will know that our country’s religion is changing when we see its basic rituals come under fire. Personally I find the singing of our national anthem at sporting events laborious and excessive. But once the toothpaste gets out of the tube . . . things get complicated. Though I find the ritual onerous and misplaced, I acknowledge the power of the rite. Objectors to singing the anthem wisely engage in a symbolic action of their own. The fact that they kneel has much more power than holding a press conference to voice their objections.

The more our country moves away from religion and its overt religious rite and symbolism, the more we will seek it elsewhere, the more important our political symbols will likely become, and the more power their proper execution will confer. Ritual, Politics, and Power makes it clear that we need symbols to make sense of reality, and will have them one way or another.

Dave

*What do our modern presidential elections decide? Given entitlement and defense spending, our federal budget has very little room to maneuver. Our system of government and regular elections keep the president more or less in check. Many believed the world would soon end after Trump’s election, but little of real substance has changed. I think Kertzer would argue that what is most often really at stake is who gets to craft our symbols. Neither candidate proposed any radical policy measure, and when Trump talked about a wall few thought it would actually happen. But . . . it symbolically meant something to talk about it. The election was bitter and contentious because of the symbolic nature of the candidates. They may not have actually done radically different things in office but they represent very different symbols of what America is or should be.

The Tactics of Religious Revolution

May13 by Dave Mathwin

J.E. Lendon’s Song of Wrath helped me see the early phases of the Peloponnesian War differently. From a modern perspective a stalemate between Athens and Sparta ca. 431-427 B.C. Sparta could not touch Athens’ navy, Athens could not deal with Sparta’s infantry, and so they danced. Lendon pointed out, however, that the culture of honor that permeated Greece allowed each side to declare victory–not victory over their opponents physical ability to wage war, but victory as a kind of pride of place. Confusion about what exactly constituted victory led to an expansion of the conflict.

This confusion, however, would never have happened had Athens not developed a navy, and broadened their source of strength. The growth of the navy and the growth of Athenian democracy went hand in hand. The growth of the navy meant expanding contact with others, and expanding one’s access to the material wealth of others. The growth of democracy meant more participation and involvement from more people in the daily operations of the state. Both involve movements “down the mountain” toward greater potential, but also towards more instability. This greater “diversity” in sense, would naturally bring about more confusion regarding the application of core values.

History does not always proceed in one direction, but the same patterns and connections emerge over time. “Politics flows downstream from culture,” and culture likewise with religion. This would mean, then, that Greece experienced a theological shift before its political shift. Though I believe in the theory, I am on very shaky ground in my knowledge of the history of Greek religion. But, I venture the theory that the beginnings of Athenian drama hearkened to a more “expansive” Greek religion rooted in the ecstatic reveries of Dionysius. Before, I think, they confined such “madness” to oracles located towards the periphery, and not easily accessed by the general population. Now, with the arrival of Dionysius and the dramatic arts, everyone (in theory) could taste something of such states. Significant democratic reform followed shortly thereafter.

Such is my theory, tenuous at best.

But as we move forward in time, towards epochs more easily observed, I think the connections between religion and ultimately, war itself, have more clarity. Gunther Rothenberg’s The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon makes no connections to religion and culture per se, but his thorough detail and clear analysis give one a good foundation to speculate a bit here and there.

Rothenberg starts with the armies that directly preceded the French Revolution. He focuses on the particular facts “on the ground” that influenced how armies functioned. What appears strange to us about the early-mid 18th century armies is how they often sought to avoid battle, and how quickly and easily generals broke off battles when the outcome appeared even slightly in doubt. We see this with in commanders like Prussia’s Duke of Brunswick, who refused to give battle to French Revolutionary forces at Valmy. No one thought this amiss–he retained the trust of Prussia’s king, changed little, and stayed in command until 1806, when Napoleon destroyed his forces at Jena. He was hardly alone.

A variety of factors helped bring about this template:

Muskets of the time had very low accuracy, so inflicting serious harm required massing of men to fire. Of course, one’s opponent would also have to mass men to do likewise. Battles where both sides actually fought hard meant very high casualties, such Torgau (1760, 30% casualties) and Zorndorf (1758, 50% casualties).
Artillery pieces existed, but they were much heavier in 1750 than in 1800. Thus, artillery was much less mobile, meaning that battle had to happen in pre-arranged spots for them to be used, or battle would not happen.
Enlisted men had a difficult life–desertion was common. To limit this, armies moved slowly, in large formations, supported by supply lines. Foraging, after all, could lead to desertion.
We talk of bloated military budgets today, but the dawn of professional armies paired with a pre-modern state apparatus meant that the military routinely took up to 25% of annual revenue, or sometimes as much as 50%.

All this meant that many kings and commanders naturally found decisive battle elusive, and casualties enormously expensive.

These factors come from “below,” so to speak. I mean by this that the particulars of strategy and tactics seemingly get created from particular physical details, such as the accuracy of muskets. We should absolutely look at history from this perspective, but we need more. We should speculate what cultural and religious underpinnings helped create these conditions from “above.” Beliefs or ideas helped bring about such conditions, just as you need rain (from above, of course) and soil to make anything grow.

Kenneth Clark pointed out that the Enlightenment defined itself by the “Smile of Reason”–a dignified, reasonable happiness, undergirded by control. Bernard Bouvier, the long-lived French Enlightenment philosophe, remarked that he had never run, and never lost his temper. When asked if he had ever laughed, he replied, “No, I have never made Ha Ha.” The thread throughout–he maintains control over his mind and body. An era devoted to such things would never value glory, which is fundamentally irrational. Also, we cannot measure glory. In a sense, glory requires an abandonment of control. This has in its religious origins “Deism”–a God who has power to create, but a God who “controls himself,” content with the benign “smile of reason.” Deism cannot brook an upsetting of the apple cart.

The French Revolution, from a political and cultural perspective, smashed all of this to pieces, and later, Napoleon finished the job. The roots of this come not from the politics of the French Revolution, but from its antecedent theological revolution.

When Louis XVI called together the Estates General, he wanted them to deal with a specific problem of taxation and tax law. Very briefly, the Estates General was comprised of three “estates,” the Church, nobility, and the “everybody else.” Each block voted as an estate, and 2 out of 3 wins. The clergy and nobility represented perhaps 5% of the population, so the third estate naturally (on this side of the American Revolution) did not want shut out by a vast minority. They insisted that Louis disband the three estates and create a new National Assembly, which would eliminate the “Estates” and obviously give the masses much more say.

This demand makes perfect sense to us, and likely we can only interpret Louis’ initial objections to this as stick-in-the-mud obscurantism. But this request contained the kernels of much more than a political revolution. We see this by looking at the medieval view of God and political power.

We know that we exist, we know that things around us exist. But in a truer sense, only God exists. That is, only God exists in a completely self-sufficient way. We need water, food, etc., to keep our existence, among other things. More importantly, we exist only because God exists–“in Him we live and move and have our being.”

God certainly has no need of us to do anything He wants done. But He creates out of fulness, out of love, to share. God shares something of His existence as well as His power. But we cannot fully participate in God’s essence–“No one has seen God at any time.” We can however, participate in His “energies,” or–in “parts” of God doled out to us (though of course God has no “parts”). Genesis 1 shows us that we cannot take everything into ourselves “in full.”

The same holds for power. In the truest sense, only God has power to accomplish His will and purpose. But, he shares, and just as He shares with us existence, so too He grants us agency and will. But we cannot have power concentrated all together. Reality, and power, must be separated and made distinct for us to have dominion over it. The works of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, hugely influential in the medieval era, make a similar point. Heaven has a distinct hierarchy, present most particularly in the angelic hosts, that we should mimic on earth, as we pray in the Lord’s Prayer–“thy will be done, on earth as it is in Heaven.”

So, a governments separation of powers has particular theological roots, with a definite social and cultural purpose. If we think of the three “estates” in France, certainly the Church should not blend/meld with the world around it, lest it be captured by the world. An aristocracy in part provides guides for culture and taste. In theory, they elevate culture through their patronage and example. To blend them in with everyone else would eliminate their distinctiveness, and culture would descend to the lower level of pork rinds and Youtube fails.*

This religious shift away from traditional understanding gave way to a very different kind of army and different kinds of wars. For starters, the jumbling up of everything and the resulting political chaos meant that the French army under the Revolution had much fewer supplies. This in turn meant that the French armies had to forage for their food. But having no supply lines also made the army more mobile. It in turn made the army more offensively oriented. If you want to eat, win the next battle and take what you can from the enemy. Napoleon said as much to his army in Italy in 1796.

Tocqueville noted the immense potential power of democratic armies which comes from the concentration of resources. To reference the mountain pattern I mentioned earlier, the base has the most mass. This increase of power would not easily be contained. With the full embrace of the descent down the mountain in Romantic ideology came a dramatic increase in the ferocity of how the French fought. Rothenburg cites a variety of examples of this. St. Just (Robespierre’s lieutenant) declared that the army should emphasize “shock tactics.” Carnot, the premier military engineer of the Revolution told his generals that,

The general instructions are always to maneuver in mass and offensively; to maintain strict, but not overly meticulous discipline . . . and to use the bayonet on every occasion.

Both Carnot and St. Just both intuited the meaning of the religious and political changes for the tactics of the French army, and perhaps this synchronization made the army so effective. Gone were the days of elegant and precise movements of armies, enter the ferocity of the massed charge. Rothenberg also shows that the French revolutionary government proved much more effective at supplying bullets than food to its army, which fits the pattern above.

Napoleon inherited rather instigated these changes, but his keen intuitive sense and knack for precise detail gave the French army a direction and impetus it previously lacked. The religion of Romanticism had its apotheosis here. The political concentration that began with the Three Estates merging into the National Assembly eventually finds Napoleon to finish the job.

We need not debate Napoleon’s great strengths as a leader, but they came at a.price. Most militaries have different armies within their Army, i.e., First Army Group, Second Army Group, etc. But Napoleon had just one army, the “Grand Army.” Just as France was One, so too would the army function as One, with one in command of all. This extreme unity of command came from Napoleon’s large ego, but also from the Revolution’s hatred of “Federalism.” Being a “federalist,” which meant wanting a separation of powers within the state, could easily get one executed between 1792-94. Such a strong reaction to a political concept demonstrates the religious roots of the change. Desire for something other than extreme unity meant something akin to an existential threat. Rothenberg notes that when Napoleon had command of the field the French did very well. But when he could not be present, and had to delegate command, as in Spain, the French army collapsed.

This concentration of power influenced everything about Napoleon’s governance, strategy, and tactics.

Napoleon naturally wanted to screen the path of the army’s advance, so he controlled borders, controlled information, prevented foreigners from staying in the country, and so on. Such control was unheard of in his day.
Because Napoleon needed total control to accomplish his strategic design of one decisive blow, he valued commanders with physical bravery as their main (and only?) virtue. Certainly commanders need courage, but Napoleon cared very little for intelligence, creativity, initiative, etc. He wanted generals that served mainly as instruments of his will.
Napoleon’s goal to win via one decisive blow required all that has already been said, but in addition, he needed a certain type of geography, as at Friedland, for example. He needed a space where he could force, or perhaps lure, his opponents in an all or nothing contest. When his opponents could easily withdraw with depth (as in Russia, most obviously) he had real problems.

Napoleon mastered the tactics of the crushing, decisive blow, but perhaps he inherited the strategy. Robespierre wrote in 1794 that,

The two opposing spirits that have been represented in a struggle to rule nature might be said to be fighting in this great period of human history to fix irrevocably the world’s destinies, and France is the scene of this fearful combat. Without, all the tyrants encircle you; within, all tyranny’s friends conspire; they will conspire until hope is wrested from crime. We must smother the internal and external enemies of the Republic or perish with it; now in this situation, the first maxim of your policy ought to be to lead the people by reason and the people’s enemies by terror.

If the spring of popular government in time of peace is virtue, the springs of popular government in revolution are at once virtue and terror: virtue, without which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country’s most urgent needs.

It has been said that terror is the principle of despotic government. Does your government therefore resemble despotism? Yes, as the sword that gleams in the hands of the heroes of liberty resembles that with which the henchmen of tyranny are armed. Let the despot govern by terror his brutalized subjects; he is right, as a despot. Subdue by terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic.

Napoleon’s own words after his participation in the siege of Toulon in 1793 differ little from Robespierre:

Among so many conflicting ideas and so many different perspectives, the honest man is confused and distressed and the skeptic becomes wicked . . . Since one must take sides, one might as well choose the side that is victorious, the side that devastates, loots, and burns. Considering the alternative, it is better to eat than be eaten.

My point here is not to equate Robespierre with Napoleon–I would rather have neither, but would much prefer Napoleon to Robespierre–nor even to morally condemn him. Politics is a dirty but necessary business. Instead, I think we should see a connection between the religious changes brought about by Rousseau, and see how it filters down into why Napoleon’s armies smashed through Europe. At the Congress of Vienna, we can see how the extremes of unity would inevitably swing back to making borders preeminent, and then, to nationalism in the latter 19th century.

With the rise of China, crypto, the war in Ukraine, twitter, and so on, most everyone has the sense that the world is changing, and most everyone disagrees on the meaning or direction of the change. We might get more clarity if we looked at how religion has changed over the last 30 years or so, which might equip us to head some things off at the pass.

Dave

*I don’t mean to be a high-brow curmudgeon. “Low” culture can and should exist. My point here is that most of the time that we want to partake of “high” culture we have to go back to pre-democratic ages, a Michelangelo statue, a Bach cantata, etc. Democratic cultures can produce “high” culture, but I would submit that they cannot create as much and not the same enduring quality. I also acknowledge, however, that not enough time has elapsed for democratic culture to be fairly judged.

9th/10th Grade: From Reality to Image

May13 by Dave Mathwin

Greetings,

This week we looked at how Napoleon rose from literal obscurity to seize power and capture the imagination not just of France, but of all Europe as well. How and why did this happen?

Human nature can tolerate chaos and disorder for only so long. The French Revolution went through governments and constitutions at a rapid pace, never able to ultimately agree on exactly what they wanted to achieve. Just as the civil wars and political violence of the late republic in Rome (ca. 100-30 B.C.) gave rise to Emperor Augustus, so too the French Revolution opened the door for someone like Napoleon. We reflect God’s image in our need for have some kind of stability to make living truly possible, so it is natural that the French (and the Romans) would pay a high price to achieve that stability. In the case of France, the price they paid involved giving up many of the democratic ideas espoused by many revolutionaries. Was the price too high? We will discuss this in the days to come.

Napoleon’s keen political opportunism, combined with a poetic military mind, gave him an excellent chance to have a shot at power in France. The Revolution stripped the traditional ruling hierarchy in France from the 18th century bare to the bone. Forget birth, forget status — anyone who could ride the tiger of French political forces could hypothetically seize power and keep it. Napoleon had these circumstances in his favor, but Napoleon’s genius allowed him to coordinate the energy of the revolution and the culture created by the revolution and channel it into the military.

Like America, the French were inspired by a creed of universal values. They had a “Declaration of the Rights of Man,” for example., just as our Declaration of Independence declared that, “All men are created equal.” If much of the energy created by Romanticism caused destruction in France, Napoleon thought that showed the energy only needed properly harnessed. Napoleon used this political culture to create a army that could go farther and faster than any other in Europe. While other European armies still operated under the Enlightenment influence (emphasizing balance, order, proportion), Napoleon’s fashioned his army using the Romantic ideals of energy, spontaneity, and movement.

Napoleon had the insight to see that the values and culture of the French Revolution created a new kind of army for France. The Enlightenment valued order, balance, and symmetry. Enlightenment societies naturally created armies that focused on the same things. Romanticism valued energy, instinct, “the deed,” and Napoleon’s personality and style fit right in with that mentality. The French Revolution created a new society with new values, that would naturally lead to a new kind of army. Not only that, the revolutionary events dispensed with large portions of the aristocratic officer corp that made up the Enlightenment oriented army of France’s past.

Military success involves many factors, and Napoleon knew how to put them together. He often battled against superior numbers, but he knew that Enlightenment armies fear loss of equilibrium and balance above all things. Furthermore, he knew that his army thrived on aggressive action. He massed his troops at certain points on the field and made bold attacks totally out of character and practice for Enlightenment oriented forces. Once he broke through at any particular point, the enemy would collapse, not just physically, but psychologically. No one likes to face their worst nightmare. Think of the opening lines of Beethoven’s 5th symphony smashing into a well ordered Haydn quartet and you can get the idea of the devastating effect French armies had under Napoleon.

Certain aspects of Napoleon are hard to like, but his story is certainly remarkable on its face. Here we have a man from Corsica, a place no one cares about, rise up from utter obscurity to best all the big-wigs at their own game. Even today, he can inspire excitement, as this 1796 painting shows:

But that youthful energy and charm diminished over time. While the painting of him on horseback crossing the St. Bernard Pass still captures something of his dynamism, something is different.

What can account for the difference in how these two works strike us?

To my mind, Napoleon seems more remote, less human, in the second picture. The event seems staged, which makes sense when we know that Jacques Louis-David, that arch-propagandist, painted it. Napoleon did cross the alps to fight the Battle of Marengo, but he did it on a donkey, and certainly not in those clothes. The expression on his face is a mask, and thus not particularly inspiring (at least to me). Napoleon drifted into becoming more of an image and less a real person.

From the above portrait, we need just a few steps and a few years until he crowned himself emperor. His transformation from man to image seems complete.

But reality can be cheated for only so long, so there remained one final stage to complete the saga. . .

Next week we will see more of how this devolution of his person and power happened.

Many thanks,

Dave M

Festivals of the French Revolution

Apr29 by Dave Mathwin

The modern west, and certainly the United States, has a weird relationship with sports. Many reasons exist for this, including the fact that sports involve great skill and entertain us. One key to their hold on us, however, certainly involves the fact that our culture has no communal rituals and emotions. Politics remains too divisive and negative to provide this. Democracy tends to prioritize individual vis a vis the group. Most forms of American Protestantism have no liturgies and no “physicality” to provide the necessary framework for shared experiences. Sporting events can provide this. Many fans have pre-game routines, rituals, dress–“liturgies,” in effect. These routines come with the eating of certain foods, and so on.

All this to say, sports functions much more like a religion than many of our churches–at least in terms of visible manifestations. Perhaps too, this explains the growth of round-the-clock, all year coverage of seasonal sports. Our need for communal “religious” experience overpowers even our well-founded moral concerns about certain sports such as football.

Because non-liturgical Protestants formed the ethos of America many of us have little experience with religious communal celebrations. Often they involve parades, food, music, and a physical embodiment of a particular belief or historical event. Below, for example, is footage from the festival on the Greek island of Cephalonia, where the relics of St. Gerasimos reside. On the saint’s feast day, one such embodiment happens when the body of St. Gerasimos “passes over” the town.

The French Revolution sought to transform all of French society. To do so, the revolutionary leaders recognized that they needed to eliminate Catholicism from the hearts and minds of the people–easier said then done. The church dictated the calendar and its rhythms, with a proliferation of festivals. These festivals formed the habits, which formed the hearts, of the French.

They needed new festivals to replace the traditional Catholic celebrations. Mona Azouf takes up this oft-neglected topic in her book, Festivals of the French Revolution.

I believe Jaroslav Pelikan made the observation that Christian feasts all celebrate events that happened in observable time. We celebrate the Incarnation, resurrection, and ascension of Christ. We have days for remembering the Mother of God and saints of whose lives we have a record. The only obvious exception to this is Trinity Sunday. But the Trinitarian nature of God is not an abstract concept, but the concrete–though also mysterious–reality of the Universe. Celebrations of actual things can have a “natural” atmosphere about them.

We can envision a joyous party for a team when they win the championship. But what about a team that, during the season itself, had a banquet to celebrate “Victory”? Things might get awkward quickly.

This challenge confronted France’s revolutionary leadership. If they wanted wholesale change, then everything old would have to go. They eliminated a great deal of the previous political leadership. They transformed the military. They killed or exiled many recalcitrant aristocrats. They went farther than almost any other revolutionary group I know of and literally changed the calendar. They understood that the Gregorian calendar, despite its mainly pagan roots, had been thoroughly Christianized and formed the unconscious rhythms of daily French life. Some argued that the new France needed no celebrations. Now that they had banished oppression, each day would have a moderate and joyous character. But eventually even the die-hards realized that they needed to give the people holy-days (i.e. holidays) to create a new national liturgy.

The festivals for the new calendar attempted to change the concept of time. They also attempted to alter the concept of space. Most old Catholic festivals took place in the town near the church. This meant that the majority of events happened within view of the cathedrals (always the tallest buildings) and in the town streets. Of course having the church building silently governing the festival would not do. But the narrow streets and the inevitable buying and selling of goods in the market, conjured up thoughts of secrecy, narrowness, “feudal conspiracy,” and the like. Festivals of the Revolution often took place in wide fields away from towns and cities. There they could escape the church building, and the open fields also aided their ideology of equality. In addition the French Revolution’s obsession with “Nature” had its role to play. Everything seems new and promising in a lush meadow at springtime.

So far so good. Here is one contemporary description of the “Festival of Liberty:”

The procession began late, around noon; it was not that the people were made to wait, as by despots at court festivals. The people turned up at daybreak in large numbers . . . but all waited until all had arrived. They took pleasure in each other’s company; nonetheless it was time to leave.

On the site of the Bastille an inauguration of the Statue of Liberty was held. Here more gathered, and it should be noted, they were favored with perfect weather.

There was no excess of pomp; no gold dazzled the eye or insulted the citizens’ humble and honorable poverty. No soldiers dripping with braid came to cast a condescending eye on the poorly dressed crowd as they passed. Here actors and witnesses merged, each taking part in the procession. They had little order but a good deal accord with one another. No one indulged in the vanity of the haughty gaze, no one set out to be a spectacle. Boredom, that son of uniformity, found no foothold among the various groups; at each step the scene changed–everyone wanted a part in the Festival of Liberty.

The festival banished luxury, but notable commemorative objects had their role. The procession opened with the Declaration of the Rights of Man, written on two stone tablets such as the 10 Commandments, though that is no match for the Declaration. Four citizens proudly carried this noble burden, each reading aloud those immeasurable first lines: “Men are born free and remain free and equal.”

Four busts followed in like manner. “Ah, there is Voltaire, that old rascal who made us laugh so much at the priests. That other, worried looking individual [Roussaeu] loved the nobles even less and never sought their favor. Who is the third? It is an Englishman, Sydney, who put his head on the block rather than bend a knee to a king. That old man there, we know him well. It is Franklin, who can be more rightly called the Liberator of the New World than a certain fop who lives not far from here [i.e. Louis XVI].

The two coffins that followed threw a somber coloring over events as we remembered the martyrs of the massacre at Nancy [some soldiers refused to obey their royalist leaning officers and were shot].

Preceded by their chains, suspended from trophies and born aloft by young ladies dressed in white, marched our loyal soldiers [loyal to the Revolution that is], with several regular citizen volunteers. They in turn preceded the Chariot of Liberty, which used the same wheels as the chariot that served for the enshrinement of Voltaire at the Palace of Reason. Let us not forget that philosophy gave us Liberty.

The chariot, modeled on the antique, was of imposing construction. On one side David sketched the story of Brutus the Elder of Rome, himself sentencing his royalist sons to death for their disobedience to the law. On the other he depicted William Tell, aiming a javelin, the target of which was an apple on his own son’s head. But at his feet we spy another javelin, one that gave independence to Switzerland by slaying the Governor of Austria. The Lady of Liberty rests on her throne, her hand at her side holding a club, with a gaze that would make king’s blush. We should never forget that the sceptre of liberty is a bludgeon to her enemies. It should also be said that six daggers formed the prow of the front of the chariot to threaten any despotism bold enough to impede the march of liberty.

With steady steps 20 democratic horses drew the chariot of the sovereign of the French people. Their progress had none of the insolence of those idle coursers fed at the stables in Versailles. They did not hold their heads high; their manes had no gold plait, nor were there plumes adorned. They walked rather ploddingly, but they kept a steady course.

Four hundred thousand citizens came to one spot with nary a mishap. The soldiers on foot had no need to mark the route, none had need to go before the crowds with bayonettes to make way. Words of peace contained this multitude, it fell into line at the sight of an ear of corn presented to it rather than a musket.

Even a breezy reading of this account reveals that the new foundation was not close to drying.

How do celebrate with the threat of force lingering? We know of the many imprisonments and beheadings in general, but even here, “Lady Liberty” holds a club. Brutus kills his sons. The chariot has daggers in the front, and so on. I have some sympathy . . . the only way to completely turn your country 180 degrees is by wrenching the wheel and holding on for dear life. The question, remains, however . . . how much can you celebrate when you have the sword of Damocles hanging over your head?

A big difference exists between saying, “Everybody dance now!” and, “Everybody dance now.”

No particular rhyme or reason exists for how the festival looks and proceeds. Certain decisions will have to be arbitrary on some level of course. Perhaps we understand, for example, that “democratic horses” would move “ploddingly” at a “steady” pace. But what if the choreographer had the horses hold their heads high and gallop down the causeway to show the “energy of liberty”? Would that have been “democratic”. . . or “aristocratic?”

Many such confusions and differences in perception led to imprisonments and even death during the Reign of Terror.

Ultimately Azouf argues that the festivals served not as an emblem of the Revolution’s success but it’s failure. One cannot invent out of thin air an embodiment of abstract ideals and expect everyone to go along with it. Azouf herself comments that the revolution in general, and the festivals in particular, represented France’s attempt to reject the entirety of their history–tantamount to rejection of their very selves. No one can sustain such efforts for long.

And yet . . . while the king eventually came back to France it did not take long to banish him again. The cultural victory of the French Revolution’s de-sacralization campaign (which, as Azouf points out, involved “sacralizing” different values) took a long time, but France’s subsequent history shows that the revolutionaries won the political battle.

We too have a similar inheritance as the French, having undergone our own radical break from the past at much the same time. We in time developed some national festivals (the World Series, the Super Bowl, the 4th of July, Thanksgiving, etc.). Time will tell whether or not this age of atomized individualism will wash those away. If so, Azouf’s work testifies to the fact that at our core we need such celebrations, and even atomized individuals will find a way to create new festivals.

“The Sword and the Olive”

Apr23 by Dave Mathwin

The modern history of Israel poses many questions, their 65 years lived at breakneck speed have given us many lessons. But the questions about their state, the Palestinians, their neighbors, and so on are enormously complex. Some historians seek to tackle all aspects of the problem but books of that nature can often be too long, heavy on details, weak on conclusions, leaving readers with no clear answers and no path to discover them on their own.

With problems of this sort, I tend to think that books that focus on one particular aspect of the issues often serve readers better than all-encompassing tomes. The narrowness of focus makes no pretense to answer every question, but it can provide a clear narrative arc, and thus give definite shape to at least some of the puzzle pieces. Martin van Creveld’s The Sword and the Olive fulfills this purpose, much like Byron Farwell’s The Armies of the Raj. Creveld does not tackle the broader “should” questions (i.e. should Israel have been given ‘x’ land, should they occupy the West Bank, etc.), but traces the effects of various decisions nicely in this history of the Israeli army.

While various militarized Zionist groups long predated W.W. II, the Israeli army takes as its main starting point the formation of the state. Early on Creveld introduces one of his main themes, that the trauma of the Holocaust created a moral weight to the Jewish cause. This in turn formed a social cohesion that enabled an army to achieve near mythical status within a few short years. Creveld lives in Israel and I assume is Jewish himself, but he attempts no sugarcoating of either Jews, Palestinians, or Arabs. His seeks to show, however, that whatever the strength of Palestinian claims, the Jews simply had stronger ones in the immediate context of the post-war years. When Palestine lingered under lame-duck British authority thousands of Jewish immigrants poured illegally into Palestine and settled beyond established boundaries. These illegal settlements received protection from Jewish militias. The British discovered that sometimes the strong must suffer the actions of the weak. How could the British enforce their authority and detain/fire upon people with numbered tattoos on their arms from Auschwitz in 1947? Every British “victory” over Jewish militias only made their position more and more untenable.

The story of the “War for Independence” in 1948 had a similar theme. Palestinians outnumbered Jews but tended to spread out in rural areas, whereas Jews settled in mostly urban areas and therefore had a more formal political structure. The countries that attacked Israel shared few common goals and even had some conflicting ones. The psychological sense of mission and purpose gave Israel a great army. As Napoleon remarked, “In war the moral is to the physical as three is to one.”

Israel was a democracy in many ways, but their initial victory helped lead to some generally non-democratic ideas.

Democracies at least like to think of themselves as defensive in nature, and so did Israel. But the nature of their geography led to a sense of being continually under siege. In war, they developed a “strike-first” mentality — war must always be fought on the enemies territory. They would have ironically agreed with the Prussian Frederick the Great’s motto of “Audacity, audacity, and still more audacity!” Even more ironically, this led Israel to develop tactics that strongly resembled the blitzkrieg of 1939-41.
As Tocqueville noted, most democracies have a generally ambivalent attitude toward the army, but not Israel. After 1948, and especially after 1967, the army had near god-like status within the state. This led to a political structure where the army had very little official civilian oversight, and even less in practical terms.
The sense of unity had to do with their circumstances, but also perhaps due to the settling of Israel by many eastern-European Jews with socialist leanings. In any case, Israel quickly developed strong censorship laws with anything to do with security. They deemed this necessary given that they felt alone not only where they stood geographically, but also in the international arena. The Holocaust showed that the world would abandon Jews if it suited them. The media helped develop these laws. But democracies are also open societies, so usually censors had the job of keeping Israeli’s ignorant of what everyone else around the world knew.

Some of these contradictions would have to work themselves out at some point.

The psychological and moral factors of the post-war years created a juggernaut military with sky high morale. But Israel’s very success would help to change this dynamic. Occupying more territory meant the need to increase the size of the army. This in turn meant more recruits, and the social cohesion that once characterized the army — an army where everyone knew everyone else — began to erode. An army with a civilian-militia ethos turned professional. Israel condensed about 200 years of Roman history (ca. 202-27 B.C.) into about 20 of their own.

Israel soon developed a much stronger military than their neighbors, but they kept their siege mentality. This meant that when they engaged the PLO in the 1970’s, and especially in Lebanon in the early 1980’s, that the strong/weak dynamic that had served them so well psychologically had now flipped against them. They were now strong and secure, their enemies had “weakness” on their side. The “us against the world” attitude that served them so well now fought against them. Now Israel faced an identity crisis. What would they do with success? Bold, aggressive, and occasional “outside the lines” actions could be tolerated and even expected when “fighting for one’s life.” But they did not get the same pass under these new circumstances. No one thought that PLO hideouts within Lebanon posed anything more than a nuisance to the state. As Creveld commented, the strong should never fight the weak for very long. Lao-Tsu noted similarly that a sword thrust into sea-water turns to rust.

The unquestioning public support that the military enjoyed for so many years now eroded, and this led to erosion within the army itself. Their war in Lebanon had far fewer casualties and far less real fighting than their previous wars, but the number of psychological maladies effecting soldiers skyrocketed, as did the number of civilians who refused to serve, or found medical exemptions for their service. The power of the government to investigate the military increased, albeit only slightly. Certainly soldiers no longer wore their uniforms off-duty, as once was common.

The Israeli army today still maintains a high level of professional competence and tactical superiority over its neighbors, but they unquestionably lost something of the “soul” of their army. And because Israel made the army such a integral part of their identity, something in Israel itself has no doubt been lost as well. What Vietnam was for us, Lebanon was for them. If our experience proves any kind of mirror, they can recover some of what they lost, but Israel will not be able to go home again. The golden age of the Israeli military has come and gone.

9th/10th Grade: The Gods Athirst

Apr23 by Dave Mathwin

Greetings,

This week we continued to look at the French Revolution through a few different events.

As I mentioned last week, how the French defined the “people” of France would be crucial to how the revolution itself would take shape. I asked the students how they would define who the “people” of America would be, and I got the following responses:

Anyone who lives here (but does this also include illegal immigrants, or people here legally on visas, green cards, etc.?)
Anyone who is a citizen (but would this include those who live here legally but are not citizens?)
Anyone who “believes” in American values and our way of life (but would this mean that someone living in Sweden could be part of the “people,” and would it exclude a citizen who did not believe in the American way?

The concept is obviously hard to define even for us, with a settled way of life and political traditions. Imagine how much harder, then, it would be to define “the people” in the midst of internal upheaval and the threat of foreign invasion. We sparked a good debate when I proposed the following scenario:

Imagine that America has undergone a major political revolution. We have replaced our form of government with a divine-right monarchy that holds power tenuously throughout the country. Of course, there are many who object to these changes and wish to see a return of the old ways.

Now suppose that China has decided to invade America with the express purpose of restoring the constitution and the president ousted by the revolution that replaced him with a king. We can further suppose that the ex-president had good relations with China and the current king wants to alter all of our trade agreements with them. Many oppose the invasion out of a sense of patriotism and/or loyalty to the Revolution, but many others hope for a Chinese victory and a restoration of the Constitution.

Which group would be more “American?” The group that wanted to defeat China, or the group that hoped for a Chinese victory over American forces?

The question carries enormous weight, for only “the people” of France will get the rights due to the French people.

With this in mind, we can look at two key events.

1. The Storming of the Royal Residence: August 10, 1792

One of the keys to kingship working is the perceived mystical distance between the king and other men. No one makes a king, kings are born. He does not chose his life, God chooses him to rule by virtue of his birth. As a man, a king is no different from anyone, but as king he takes on a different identity.

Royalty has always sought to maintain this distance through their dress, their manners, their homes, and so on.

At the start of the revolution many still wanted a strong king in France. As the revolution progressed most slowly abandoned tat idea until Louis’ very existence threatened the revolution itself. Finally on August 10 a mob stormed the palace, brutally slew many of the guards and servants, and might have done the same to Louis and Marie had they not escaped. In one act, the people eradicated the perceived distance between the monarchy and themselves. Louis had no power left.

2. The September Massacres, 1792

The events of August 10 did not cause the Austrians and Prussians to invade France all by itself, but it did propel those armies to greater alacrity in their attempt to restore Louis’ power. As the armies moved closer to France, many feared that prisons in France (which contained ‘counter-revolutionaries’ after all) would be liberated to serve as “5th Column” to aid the foreign invasion.

From September 2-5 mobs went to various prisons, monasteries, and convents in France systematically butchering most of those inside. The death of Marie Antoinette’ friend Princess Lamballe exemplifies France’s descent into paganism. They cut off her head and paraded it in front of Marie’s prison window. Then, according some accounts, they also cut out her heart and ate it.

3. The Death of Marat

Jean-Paul Marat failed at most things in life before he came to edit the tabloid “The Friend of the People.” More than others he celebrated and encouraged the violence of the revolution, at one point calling for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of the “enemies of the people.” A young woman named Charlotte Corday believed in the Revolution but also thought Marat a tyrant. She gained access to him and plunged a knife into his chest.

Corday hoped that Marat’s death would quell violence, but tragically it had the opposite effect. She hoped to end tyranny, but created a martyr. It also served to confirm the paranoia of many other revolutionary leaders. Who could you trust? Corday posed as a revolutionary, but struck against it. Anyone, in fact, could secretly be an enemy. Marat’s death did not create the Reign of Terror, but it did help contribute to it.

If you have interest, Simon Schama has an excellent treatment of David’s famous painting of Marat’s death below.

One of the ways in which they attempted to smoke-out counter-revolutionaries was through the then equivalent of a modern day block party. Usually attendance at such gatherings was mandatory, for they meant to celebrate the revolutionary oneness of the people. It sounds harmless enough, but these “parties” terrified many. You had to be careful not to stand out in the crowd. The government had proclaimed the need to strike out against “fanaticism” and “moderation.” If you showed too much enthusiasm for the Revolution, you probably were not being natural and so only sought to mask your true anti-revolutionary intent. If you showed too little enthusiasm, you again showed your lack of zeal. This is why these “parties” terrified so many. You had to avoid standing out in the crowd.

What would you wear to such gatherings? If you overdressed, you could be seen as “better than others.” If you underdressed, you obviously showed no respect for the “people of France.” What food should you bring? Bring too little, you’re a cheapskate, don’t care about the people, etc. Bring too much and you fall prey to the “you think you’re better than us,” suspicion, or perhaps others might think that you have secretly hoarded goods and hidden wealth from “the people.”

This fear of being labelled a hoarder proved especially potent. The revolution had not improved economic conditions in France, contrary to expectations. But with their Enlightenment beliefs, the removal of the bad monarchical institutions should have, by definition, fixed the problem. The fact that everything did not work well showed that the Revolution must have been undermined from within. Hence, the need to find hoarders, the secret enemies of the people. Saturn had turned on his children — the gods athirst.

I also wanted the students to think about how the layout of the city can contribute to the possibility of a revolt. Many in 1789 commented that few cities had a layout more conducive to revolution than Paris. Here is an image of the city in 1788:

I then asked the students to redesign the city to make revolution less likely, which meant of course they had to think about why the city might be susceptible to revolution in the first place.

A few generations later Napoleon III wanted the city redesigned specifically to discourage the possibility of further revolution. The map below indicates some of his changes, with the red strips representing broad thoroughfares, and the the darker blue representing wide public spaces.

Many thanks!

Dave M

9th/10th Grade: The Inevitability of Revolutionary Violence?

Apr8 by Dave Mathwin

Greetings,

This week we saw the French Revolution immediately take a dangerous turn, and I wanted us to consider why violence formed such an integral part of the Revolution. I think we can offer a variety of possible answers to this question.

Historian Simon Schama made an interesting observation regarding the nature of the change that gripped France. If we go back to the France during the heyday of Versailles, we see the king rigidly controlling events. The spectacle of Versailles began with the king and sometimes ended with him as well.

Louis XVI had a modernist, progressive bent. He loved science, and joyfully hosted some of the first ballooning experiments on the grounds of Versailles. The experiments were a great triumph, but in some ways worked against Louis. With the balloons up in the air, nature controlled the spectacle. The wind blows,i.e., nature speaks, and the reaction occurs. The air was public space. We see this concept of the Revolution as a “force of nature” in David’s drawing of the Tennis Court Oath (note the rush of wind occupying the top areas of the painting).

The revolution then, was a “force of nature” in the minds of many, outside the control of the king, or anyone else, for that matter. One must follow where it led — you had no choice.

Traditionally historians have viewed the Revolution as happening in two phases:

1) The idealistic, peaceful, “good” phase from 1789-1792, and

2) The ugly, destructive phase that began in 1792 and lasted until 1794.

Following Simon Schama and his stellar book Citizens, I disagree with this characterization. Violence and political action went hand in hand in 1788, for example, a year before the Revolution proper began. Bastille Day in 1789 saw the mob beat Captain DeLaunay to death and put his head on a pike. The language of blood had much cache in the rhetoric of the time, with orators often proclaiming their desire to shed their blood for the cause, or the need for blood to “water the soil of the fatherland,” blood as the “cement of the new republic,” and so on.

Part of understanding the violence involves understanding the nature of sin itself. How often have we thought that if we do this one bad thing, we can quickly then step back, shut the lid on our misdeeds, and return to righteous behavior. But as Scriptural language makes clear, once sin has room to maneuver it tends to take control. Once they used violence to achieve small objectives, it began to have a life and logic of its own. Pandora’s box had opened.

Part of the reason for the violence also involves what the French tried to accomplish with their revolution. Stop and ponder for a moment how many political questions we take for granted. Who gets rights? Who is a citizen? How should we apportion political power? Americans disagree a lot about politics, but nearly all our arguments deal with what to do within the existing system.

But what if we had to completely rethink all of those things on the fly, for this is what the French faced. Naturally they had many disagreements about fundamental political questions. Under pressure from foreign powers, did the French have the space and time to decide these questions? The lazy way out would mean violence. One can weary of talking endlessly, especially under pressure. “Since we cannot agree on who gets the last cookie and I’m tired of talking, I’ll shove you out of the way and grab it myself.”

The art of the period reflected some of this change of mindset. The artistic style called “Rococo” tended to dominate in the period prior to the Revolution, with this painting as perhaps the pre-eminent example:

The emphasis here was on light, softness, and the pleasures (though its critics used the word “frivolity) of life. Art presaged the political shift of the Revolution. The colors got bolder, the subject matter more serious, and the focus shifted from celebrating life to facing death.

Here is Jacques Louis-David’s “The Oath of the Horatii,” from a story in Roman history that celebrated the sacrifice of the three brothers for Rome.

And below, “Brutus and His Sons,” which again uses Rome as the narrative template. Brutus served as one of Rome’s first consuls, its chief law enforcement officer. But two of his sons participated in a plot to bring back the monarchy. The punishment was death, and Brutus had the duty of executing the punishment. As in the picture above, the men have steely resolve while the women swoon:

The semi-apocalyptic tone of the art no doubt captured the existing mood, but also propelled French society toward violence.

We also cannot underestimate the climate of fear that gripped France. They knew that their attempts to remake their society would draw the ire of other nations. Austria and Prussia sent armies to invade their country, and France itself had to deal with an army whose aristocratic officer corp had largely fled or been discredited. But once the French began the Revolution, they could not turn back. They had already done enough to face punishment from other nations or a restored Louis XVI. If, for example, you knew you would be hung for the thefts you committed, would you try and kill the witnesses? What more could the authorities do to you? Facing domestic uncertainty and international pressure, success became mandatory for the revolutionaries. This desperation surely contributed to the violence. Tragically (and not surprisingly) they eventually turned this fear and desperation on each other. Saturn would eat his children.

It was in this climate of fear that the French had to decide who constituted the “people” of France. Usually nations decide this along the lines of birth, but many in France thought this could not work, since not all favored the Revolution. If those who did not go along with the Revolution were “oppressors” of the people, could oppressors of the people be part of the people? Why give rights to those who work against the nation? This led to the French defining citizenship along ideological lines, which had a disastrous impact on the Revolution.

Violence played a crucial part in this decision too. On Bastille Day crowds already began executing people without trial. If those executed were part of “the people” then their actions were obviously illegal. But to call those actions illegal would call the whole revolution into question. So, the natural conclusion would be that those executed were not in fact part of France after all, and not deserving of rights.

Next week we will see where these ideas lead the Revolution.

9th/10th Grade: Romanticism

Apr1 by Dave Mathwin

Greetings,

This week we looked at Jean Jacques Rousseau and the Romantic movement. Last week in our examination of the Enlightenment, we said that it both built upon the past (Scientific Revolution) and reacted against it (Louis XIV’s Versailles). So Romanticism both reacted against the Enlightenment emphasis on reason and built upon its rejection of current society.

We think of the Romantics praising the virtues of emotion, but we should not interpret the word ’emotion’ in a narrow sense. Rousseau focused more on our ‘gut,’ or our ‘inner man.’ For Romantics society itself was humanity’s enemy. All of its trappings, like wigs, crevattes, five-fork dinners, etc. put a ridiculous husk over the kernel of our true selves. Anyone who ever felt uncomfortable among the wine and cheese set, for example, can identify with at least some of what Rousseau preached. Manners and mores, if taken too far, can be elitist, exclusionary, and anti-human. When we consider that the picture to the left depicted actual hairstyles as worn by aristocratic ladies, we begin to identify with what the Romantics advocated. Rousseau wanted to return to what was “natural.” It makes sense, then, that one of his main causes involved getting mothers to breast feed their own children, rather than handing them over to wet-nurses.

Rousseau and the Romantics wanted to free people from society to live as they were truly meant to live.

For them, mankind need not fear logic and reason, but instead needed to realize that they do not come first in human development. We add them later, whereas our emotions arise naturally from within us from the very start. Reason, on the other hand, must be imposed from without. So our ‘guts’ are better guides to behavior than our reason.

From a Christian perspective one can say that God gave both emotion and reason, and that both can guide us to truth. We come back to the idea of truth in tension. Unfortunately we see the abandonment of this tension in Rousseau, who thought for example, that the tragic Lisbon earthquake was God’s judgment against cities. C.S. Lewis’ famous essay “Men Without Chests” makes the point that, as valuable as our heads and our guts are, they need the “Chest” to act as a moral mediator. Separated from right moral guidance, both emotion and reason turn tyrant. Jonah Goldberg has a humorous but insightful take on what happens when men are left to their own devices here. When the forces of Enlightenment and Romanticism combined and then turned against each other in the French Revolution, the results would be less humorous.

Like the Enlightenment movement, the Romantics were on to at least a part of something. One example of this is the idea of breastfeeding. For centuries women in the elite of society considered it “vulgar” to breastfeed their own children and farmed them out to wet-nurses. One of the first goals of the “Romantic” movement was to get women to see that what was “natural” in this case was good. What could be more “unnatural” than the separation of mother and infant child? And yet, such practices persisted.

The problem of course lay in how one defined “natural.” If every “natural” thing has a direct moral imperative, then we must define “natural” very carefully. Like the Enlightenment then, the Romantics did not see the world or humanity as basically fallen, and this would bring forth terrible consequences in due course.

We looked at the tragic case of Louis XVI. In him we have a good man who, in turbulent times, lacked the foresight to be a good king. As a French king, he probably thought that supporting the Americans against the British was just something that French kings do. But Louis’ aid to the colonies, which involved people trying to overthrow a monarchy, can be compared to bringing the kudzu plant to the U.S. You are importing your own destruction, though Louis likely did not see this, just as we did not with the infamous plant. When an idea (like some plants) gets transplanted away from its native soil the results may be much different than we anticipated.

As the official diplomat to Paris, Ben Franklin knew exactly what chord to strike with the French. He knew that the French idealized the Americans as fulfilling Rousseau’s dream of living close to nature, and milked that as much as possible. To the left is a famous portrait of Rousseau, and the outfit Franklin donned for his portrait in France while on a diplomatic mission.

Louis attempted to enact many helpful reforms, and this makes his tragedy more poignant. Many have the mistaken idea that France rebelled against a decrepit regime bent on maintaining the status quo at all costs. In fact, many philosophes felt that France had the perfect king for the times. Louis worked hard at fiscal responsibility. He abandoned much of the waste and foolishness of Versailles. He avidly patronized the sciences, and founded the first known school anywhere for the blind. France did not rebel against a king who refused to change, they rebelled against a king who tried hard to modernize France. We shall have to unpack the significance of this later when we look at his trial under the Revolutionary government.

Usually no matter how often we criticize our Presidents we profess admiration for our First Ladies. Not so in France. Marie Antoinette, queen of France, was hated almost from the moment she set foot in the country. Many stood against her from the very start, but her actions, innocent though many may have been did not help her cause.

The bad press began the moment the French found out that Louis’ bride hailed from Austria, a traditional rival of France, a step-child. Louis, and thus France as a whole, was seen as “marrying down.”

Strike one against Marie.

Marie was desperate to please. So, if the above picture showed how high-born ladies should wear their hear, she would do one better. She wore this hairstyle (the picture is accurate, not satirical) to commemorate a French naval victory. The French, with their vicious eye for taste, could easily detect when someone tries too hard.

So, as the Romantic movement gained acceptance, the pendulum swung the other way. Marie eagerly dove headfirst into the new style. She would be “simple.” She asked Louis to build her a special estate where she and her friends could pretend to be farm girls and feed sheep, milk cows, and so on. Again, Marie seems to be “trying too hard” to almost ludicrous proportions.

Her friend Elisabeth Vigee-Lebrun painted the famous portrait of her to the left.

This new image would surely work, right? In this portrait she was elegantly simple, just as Rousseau would want her. Marie very much hopedInstead, once again the French detected desperation, someone who obviously was not “natural.” “You are queen of France. Act like one, dress like one!” the French seemed to say. Marie did not figure out how to act like a queen to anyone’s liking, perhaps not even her own.

When Marie finally had children, she settled down, and enjoyed her role as a mother. But much damage had already been done. Part of this damage stemmed from the personality differences between Louis and Marie. Introverted Louis never liked parties, and used any excuse to retire early (one source indicates that Marie purposely set Louis’ clocks ahead in hopes of having Louis retire even earlier). Once Louis left, Marie felt like she could cut loose, and played cards and danced the night away. Much of this behavior was very likely innocent, but it raised many eyebrows, and rumors flew. Louis, did what any wealthy, decent, and befuddled husband might do and bought her lots of expensive things. Marie got the blame for this, not Louis. In time various epitaphs floated around France, including, “The Austrian Whore,” and “Madame Deficit.” Marie could never understand the impact of her actions, and how important image was to her success in politics.

Next week we will see Louis lose control of events in the French Revolution, and how France’s abandonment of what Lewis called “the chest” would wreak terrible havoc.

Dave

Language as Myth

Mar28 by Dave Mathwin

One will sometimes hear thinkers of a materialist stripe say something along the lines of, “A table is obviously a table, but words like truth or beauty are mere abstractions, a placeholder/convenience for certain ideas that different cultures have,” and so on. The problem with this lies in the fact that most everything anyone can think of deserves the title, “abstraction.” A table is not one thing but many things put together in a particular arrangement. Is it only a delusion that we call a table a table? Any living creature has many millions of separate parts, yet these parts function as a unity. Even an atom has multiple parts that we “conveniently” put together as a whole. We all “abstract” reality. Reality functions, in this way, as myth. The title of Ernst Cassirer’s difficult (for me at least) but significant work, Language and Myth could perhaps have the title Language IS Myth.

Writing at the end of WW II mean that Cassirer stood near the end of the unquestioned dominance of the scientific worldview. The deconstruction of the coherence of more traditional ways of knowing seemed complete. Cassirer was struck with the fact that the, “theory of knowledge as philosophers had developed it since the Middle Ages concerned itself solely with ‘facts’ and the development of orderly thoughts about facts. . . . Human intelligence begins with conception, the prime mental activity; the process of conception always culminates in symbolic expression. ” The book’s translator Susanne Langer noted in her introduction that, “Myth never breaks out of the magic circle of its figurative ideas. . . . But language, born in that same magic circle, has the power to break its bounds; language takes us from the myth making to phase of logical thought and the conception of facts.”

Hence, “Myth is an inherent necessity of language.”

In the early chapters Cassirer looks at theorist Max Muller. For Muller,

the mythical world is essentially one of illusion–but an illusion that sings its explanation whenever, the original, necessary self-deception of the mind, from which the error arises, is discovered. . . . From this point it is but a single step to the conclusion which the modern skeptical critics of language have drawn: the complete dissolution of any alleged truth content of language . . . Moreover, from this standpoint, not only myth, art, and language, but even theoretical knowledge itself becomes a phantasmagoria; for even knowledge can never reproduce the true nature of things as they are.

If myth be nothing, Cassirer writes, “it is mystifying indeed that this shadow should . . . evolve a positive activity and vitality in its own right, which tends to eclipse the immediate reality of things . . .” All in all Cassirer critiques “that naive realism which regards the reality of objects as something directly and unequivocally given–literally something tangible.” Objects in themselves cannot give meaning directly, for every object is a contract of other objects–hence, reality requires myth-making to achieve any sort of comprehension.

Most interesting to me were his thoughts on the idea that gods in the ancient world served mainly as embodied synthesized concepts. Much of what I learned about ancient religion growing up often amounted to something like, “The ancients didn’t know about electricity, so they thought Zeus threw lightning bolts.” Of course, how such unsophisticated people all over the ancient world managed to achieve such great heights of philosophy, architecture, etc. remains a mystery. Perhaps aliens?” Cassirer has a better approach, though also incomplete.

He begins talking about the “realness” of ancient religious feeling, even through the classical period in Greece, often thought of an an irreligious era. “Reason, Wealth, Chance, Feasting . . . Whatever comes to us suddenly [is] like a sending from heaven. Whatever rejoices or oppresses us, seems to religious consciousness like a divine being.” From these momentary “daimons” a new kind of god emerged, not from immediate experience but from “the ordered and continual activities of mankind,” which happened as our relation to the outer world went from passivity to active engagement. These gods have a narrow “width” but a degree of depth and permanence, as every year one needs to plant, sow, fish, and so forth. “Whenever a special god is conceived, it is invested with a special name, which is derived from the particular activity that has given rise to the deity.” Here we see the connection between language and religion, and how we need both to synthesize and create meaning from experience. Cassirer, using the work of Hermann Usener, thinks too much in an evolutionary way, but represents a big improvement from standard ways of viewing ancient religion.

Again–we have the link between language, myth, religion, all as examples of a synthesizing of material (be that material certain sounds or certain experiences) into meaning. Cassirer seems to lean heavily on the side of “emergence” in the Emanation/Emergence debate, but we can take his point. Cognitive scientist John Vervake has made a similar point about the current conflict in the Ukraine. Everyone is worried that something will happen to expand the war, but that “something” may not come from individual agency. Rather, war means participation in “Ares/Mars.” When we describe war as having “a logic of its own” we mean that a separate “life” exists as a corporate personality that drives decisions. We get enmeshed within this life and follow its bidding.

We can assert that we control this “life” because we created it. But I think it more accurate to say that we, speaking from the “emergence” side of the coin, call it into being rather than create it. History shows that such “ghosts” can be notoriously difficult to control. Think for example, of all of the allied moral denunciations of German use of chemical warfare in W.W. I, or the German bombing of civilian England in W.W. II. But England used chemical weapons in W.W. I shortly after the Germans, and the British and American forces killed far more civilians with bombs than the axis powers in W.W. II. As Vervake noted, these “collective ideations” (which I think was his term) resemble gods of the Bronze Age in Homer’s Iliad. They have abundant power, but grant no wisdom.

We can say the same for the internet itself. Humans created it, but we also called something into being, as we entered a hybrid-partnership of sorts. We feed it with attention, and it in turn learns and feeds things back to us. Surely, the internet has an agency, and seeks to add to its agency all the time.

Ok, the stuff about the internet I stole directly from

and both Vervake and Pageau explain the concept much better than I could.

The new Compact magazine has an article by Edwin Aponte that attempts to split the horns of the free speech wars. Most look at the fact that the left championed free speech in the 60’s, and now seems to favor more restrictions, or that the Right championed the “Moral Majority” and now wants comedians to say whatever they feel like saying, as either ironic or puzzling. But Aponte sees something else, writing

Consider also the activist left’s resistance to the Reagan White House’s unofficial gag order on public discussion of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, and then, barely a decade later, when the Democratic Party held the executive branch, the push for what was at the time called “political correctness”—a speech rubric spearheaded by many of the same left organizers.

In other words, today conservatives are out of power and railing against the canceling of comedians who make jokes about transgender people; tomorrow, the same people may be in power and leading the charge in favor of a ban against transgenderism in schools. This is borne out by the Times editorial. Per the survey, 66 percent of respondents agreed that democracy is built on the free and open exchange of ideas, yet a whole 30 percent also allowed for the curbing of speech if it runs afoul of acceptable etiquette.

Aponte makes the noteworthy claim that the root of this dichotomy lies in the Liberal (the term includes the modern Left and Right) project itself, which pledges unrestrained autonomy to grant one’s desires. Well, one’s desires could easily include both the right to say what you think and to not be bothered by what other people think. When Liberalism chucked Tradition and social mores as guides, they opened these floodgates.

I think, however, that something else is happening. In his farewell address, George Washington warned his countrymen against the formation of political parties, advice which we ignored almost immediately. Perhaps participation in democracies means that we cannot help but form political collectives to try and get what we want. This in turn catches us up in the war of “gods” who seek power but grant no wisdom. Language itself shows that we cannot avoid synthesizing meaning, but how we do so . . . that’s up to us.

Dave

Tribal Bureaucracy

Mar25 by Dave Mathwin

This was originally posted in 2015–you will see some dated references.

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The phrase “All is fair in love and war,” has various attributions, but it certainly has a direct hold on the popular imagination. But I wonder if those that cite it truly believe in it. What I think we tend to mean when we say this is, “If the side I’m rooting for does something that helps them win, I generally approve.” But if the other side does it . . .

War also tends to come with a relentless osmosis. So the English and French cried “foul” when the Germans started using chemical weapons in W.W. I, and then used them themselves. The same happened in W.W. II. First the Nazi’s bombed London and then the Allies retaliated in more than kind. It is this spiritual cost of war that often gets ignored amidst the loss of life.

These things flitted through my mind as I read the painful and at times darkly comic Guantanamo Diary by Mohamedou Slahi. The scars and trauma of 9/11 come through on almost every page of this book, and if his narrative speaks even half-truths, we have much to mourn and much to fear about who we are as a people.

Briefly, Slahi received an excellent education growing up in Mauritania, gaining fluency in French and German along with Arabic (in prison he learned English well enough to write his diary in English). He traveled a lot as well throughout Europe and also visited Canada. During the 1990’s he traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the Russians (so he claims) where he certainly met others in the Taliban and Al Queda. He returned to his native Mauritania. While there he was arrested and questioned in relationship to the Millennium plot, and then released. His government, at the request/likely insistence of the United States then asked him to come in for questioning again after 9/11. He agreed to come in voluntarily to “clear the air,” so to speak, and from that moment on, disappeared into the bureaucratic abyss. He has yet to be charged with anything, and yet remains in detention.

Shahi comes off as a very sympathetic figure in his narrative. Perhaps we should expect this. We naturally sympathize and accept the point of view of the main character of almost any story. But surely we might just as naturally wonder to what degree we can trust his account of events.

In a recent podcast interview, Bill Simmons and Chuck Klosterman discuss Klosterman’s recent GQ article on Tom Brady. In their remarks both agreed that our culture has a serious problem. Whatever narrative emerges first (in this case they were discussing the ridiculous nature of “Deflate-gate”) embeds itself deeply in the American consciousness. Whatever narrative emerges next not only has to fight for space in the national narrative, it has the unfair burden of having to also disprove the first narrative, even though its only “crime” was to be known second and not first. Perhaps this is not only a modern American problem — perhaps this has always been the case with humanity in general. But if so the problem seems accentuated in our day by the fact that we have a very short national attention span and will quickly to move from one issue to the next.

Quite possibly, this same problem exists when reading Slahi’s diary. We should not hold his account to a higher standard than accounts from our own government who initially branded him as a mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, just because this comes from “our side” and it was the story we heard first. We should treat his account as truthful unless otherwise contradicted by some other source. Admittedly, this is difficult as contradicting him might reveal classified information. Such is the dilemma of democracy in the 21st century.*

Briefly the “case” against him:

He had been in Afghanistan and fought with Al-Qaida against the Russians. His own words on this subject — “I fought with Al Qaida, but then we did not wage jihad against America. They told us to fight against the Communists. In the mid-90’s they wanted to wage jihad against America, but . . . I didn’t join them in that idea; that’s their problem. . . . I am completely independent of this problem.”
His brother-in-law, Abu Safs, was a high-ranking member of Al-Queda. Alhough interestingly, we have documented transcripts of Safs urging AQ leadership not to proceed with the 9/11 attacks. In turn, might this have meant that Slahi knew of the impending attacks?
He knew different languages and had traveled abroad a great deal.
The United States accepted that he had no knowledge of/participation in the Millennium plot. But it became apparent that Slahi had not told the whole truth about other matters during this questioning, which even Slahi himself admits. Apparently he denied knowing a man whom he did meet at one point for a short time (although we know nothing about the nature of their relationship). Might then he know other things about terrorists that he has not revealed?
In any case, a federal judge reviewed his case and found no basis to detain him any further. After some outrage from some New York newspapers, the Obama administration appealed the decision, which has yet to come to trial again. He remains in a bottomless, meaningless detention.

There appears to be very little else against him, and ten plus years of detention have yet to produce a single criminal charge. It appears we have, as Marine prosecutor Col. Morris Davis commented, a case of, “a lot of smoke and no fire.” Another interesting testimony comes from Lt. Col. Stuart Crouch, a former prosecutor on the case. He had left the military, but a good friend died in one of the planes on 9/11. He decided to reenlist to, in his words, “get a crack at the guys who attacked the United States.” Eventually he had a total change of heart and withdrew from the case. He recounted in an interview his realization.

Right in the middle of this time . . . I was in church and we had a baptism. We got to the part of the liturgy where the congregation repeats–I’m paraphrasing here–but the essence is that we respect the dignity of every human being and seek peace and justice on earth. And when we spoke those words . . . I could have been the only one there. You can’t come in here on Sunday and as a Christian ascribe to the dignity of every human being and . . . continue with the prosecution using that kind of evidence.

Some may argue that while we do not have enough evidence to charge him with a crime, a very slim chance remains that Slahi is smart enough to pull a huge snow-job on us. A chance remains that he may possibly know of some person we don’t know about yet that may seek to do us or others harm (though honestly, since he has been detained for so long, it seems he could know nothing about any possible plans).

Are we willing to take that chance? To me it seems a really safe bet.

Ironically, it appears that his intellect worked against him in a Catch-22 fashion. Interrogators admitted that they had nothing concrete to pin on him, but “smart people leave no traces.” If he wasn’t smart, he would obviously be guilty . . . because he would have left traces. Being smart, he naturally left no traces of his guilt.

Such bizarre moments pockmarked his narrative.

For example, interrogators revisited one particular conversation he had with his brother in which Slahi urged him to “concentrate on school,” with an extended conversation about “tea and sugar.” Since this came up in more than one interrogation, U.S. intel must have thought that such statements involved a code of some kind. Shahi could not convince them otherwise.

Of course some detainees no doubt bear some measure of guilt. One prisoner sought a plea-bargain with prosectors. But this detainee wanted to be generous to Slahi, who resided in the cell next to his. He would only accept a plea-bargain if they gave one to him as well. Prosecutors would have loved to offer Slahi a deal, but do to so they would have to charge him with something, and despite repeated efforts, they could not come up with anything.

So the end result was no charge and no plea bargain, but instead a renewed insistence that he must be guilty of something, and so renewed interrogations. After all, Slahi’s next door neighbor thought he was guilty.

A few final reflections . . .

I absolutely hate and abhor attempts to change meaning of words based on the “letter of the law.” Interrogators subjected him to sexual molestation, sleep deprivation, forced continuous water drinking (to bring about constant urination and sleep deprivation), and the like. They did not physically pummel him, but no matter. He was tortured. I beg us to call a spade a spade.

Shahi does not paint himself a brave resistance hero or a martyr for truth. He routinely complains of his back pain. He admits freely that he lied at points during torture and finally even implicated others, something he earlier vowed not to do, simply to make the torture stop. He hated certain guards, but liked others and even sympathized with their plight. He mentioned several times that war brings out the best and worst on both sides.

Surprisingly, when he vented his anger — which was not often — he did so not at the United States but at his home country of Mauritania. He saw the Mauritanian government as utter cowards for handing him over the U.S. with no specific charges, in direct violation of their constitution and his rights as a Mauritanian citizen.

Eventually he gained the privilege to see movies and watched Black Hawk Down with his interrogators and guards. He did not enjoy the movie much, but the reaction of the Americans troubled him greatly. Some soldiers cried bitterly for the Americans that died, no doubt justly. But Slahi wondered why they shed no tears for the hundreds of Somalis who died, some of them no doubt forced to fight by a warlord dictatorship, some of them civilians. Americans, Slahi mused, are essentially tribal and care for their own kind not just in preference to others, but to the exclusion of others. In this we are not exceptional, but just like most anyone else. Ultimately, however, Shahi’s continued detention shows us entirely sacrificing his dignity and freedom on the slim chance that perhaps he knows (or once knew) something or someone.

I will pass over his experiences with guards who knew very little about Christianity trying to evangelize him amidst torture and illegal detention. Shahi, for his part, seemed to enjoy picking apart their arguments. But a few other comments on his opinions about Americans are amusing if not instructive:

Americans are just big babies. In my country it’s not appropriate for somebody my age to sit in front of a console and waste his time. And Americans worship their bodies. They eat well. [Name redacted] was like anyone else. He bought more food than he needed, worked out even during duty, talked constantly [about sex], played computer games, and was very confused when it came to his religion.

And,

Many young men and women join the U.S. forces under the misleading propaganda . . . which makes people believe that the Armed Forces are nothing but a big Battle of Honor. . . . But the reality is a little bit different. To go directly to the bottom line, the rest of the world thinks of Americans as revengeful barbarians. That may be harsh, and I don’t believe the dead average American is a revengeful barbarian. But the U.S. government bets its last penny on violence as the magic solution for every problem.

A few brief comments on the blurbs on the jacket cover and other such comments made about the book. Those that read it, like myself, emerge fairly convinced of at least Shahi’s legal innocence as well as liking him. I believe that we have done a grave injustice to Slahi and his family that nothing can erase. But some commentators fall into the tribalism that Slahi denounced, that Slahi himself avoids. For some, the U.S. gets no sympathy at all. They make no attempt to understand the serious intel dilemmas after the trauma of 9/11 we faced, no attempt to understand the gravity of our situation. For them, the U.S. is a kind of “evil empire.”**

I think rather that we acted, and do still act, the way many frightened and confused people act when they have very little to comfort them. I agree that we sometimes act foolishly and wrongly, but probably no more so than most other major powers. We had a few strands of intel that might mean something . . . and we felt forced to act because not acting might possibly result in catastrophe. It is a terrible situation, and it appears that we have done terrible things in its midst.

But I do not mean to let ourselves off the hook. We no doubt felt forced. But in reality, we are simply selfish*** and will remain so as long as Slahi stays in the legal Neverland of Guantanamo.

Dave

*There is the added question of whether or not the various tortures he underwent may have altered his perception of the past.

**John le Carre must have been only too delighted to write a blurb for this book, as he been roasting the west in general, and the U.S. in particular, for years. Alas for the bygone days of his great spy fiction from the 1960’s and 70’s.

***Via Marginal Revolution came this quote related to the Syrian refugee crisis.

Even 4-year-old Syrian orphans are too dangerous to welcome to the United States, says New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie. What sort of man turns away desperate orphans out of fear? Christie’s words and actions are shameful and unbecoming of a great nation—as are those of 25 other governors who said they will work to keep Syrian refugees from moving to their state. Is America no longer the home of the brave?

9th/10th Grade: Truth Without Tension

Mar25 by Dave Mathwin

Greetings.

This week we returned to Europe in the mid 18th century and began to look at the ideas that shaped the coming French Revolution. In this “Prelude to the Revolution” unit I hope that students will see that ideas have consequences. The French pursued truth, or at least what they believed to be truth, with a passion, but this pursuit nearly destroyed them as they attempted to entirely remake their nation from the ground up.

How then, can we recognize truth?

Christians have many answers at their disposal to this question, but we discussed in class that many of our foundational truths are truths in tension. So we see that God is one God in three persons, Christ is fully God and fully Man, Scripture is the Word of God written by men, and so on. Sometimes we can know that we are close to Truth when we feel pulled in different directions at once.

Christians also realize that Ultimate Reality (God Himself) is personal, not abstract or propositional. In inviting us to know Him, God does not want us primarily to know truths about Him (though this too is necessary), but to have a relationship with Him. So truth must have an incarnational, or personal aspect to it for it to fully achieve the status of “Truth.”

French society needed reform in the mid-18th century. The dominance Louis XIV bought came at a cost, and one cost was the inherent contradictions that Louis’s France left unresolved, and in fact widened. When untethered from “truth in tension” we might expect wild swings or “over-corrections” in the ideas and solutions of the time. The Enlightenment is no exception. But the Church needs to have judgment begin at home, for it was precisely the Church’s relative weakness in the aftermath of the wars of religion and the Scientific Revolution that opened the door for people to seek truth elsewhere.

The Enlightenment had many noble motives and goals. Many “philosophes” (as French Enlightenment philosophers were known) saw that society had become a kind of anachronism, guided by long outdated feudal customs. Certain areas in society operated autonomously, without reason or justice. Many stories abound for example, of “press-gangs” rounding up derelicts or drunks and forcing them into the navy or infantry. From the perspective of many, society seemed to be made only for the elite, or for those with connections, or special, secret knowledge (the echoes of Louis’s ridiculous system at Versailles form a good example). Enlightenment thinkers sought to free society from archaic mystery and make it livable for the common man. Reason’s clear light revealed the absurdity of class and privilege. The Philosophes prided themselves as sensible men. Ben Franklin, for example, records basic advice like, “A penny saved is a penny earned.” No wild Platonistic musings here, thank you very much.

One sees this spirit animating their music as well. Haydn, for example, wanted to write for the farmer and tradesman, so his music has a popular danceability to it that one immediately perceives. Odd meter changes, wild swings in tempo, and so on might have been perceived as “elitist,” or inaccessible.

In the early Enlightenment one also sees a glorification of the everyday. Those outside the nobility, like Christopher Wren in England, got picked to design St. Paul’s Cathedral. Enlightenment era paintings depicted women realistically, and showed life as it was really lived by most people. It elevated simple pleasures of good company and conversation.

For centuries the Church had controlled much of daily life, especially education. This too needed freed for “the people.” With people loosed from institutional religion, they would be freed to be their “natural” religious selves. No more obscure doctrines, no more mystery, just the clear light of reason. So in the end, society, education, religion, culture — all this seemed to come down from their pedestals on high and into the people’s hands. The early years of the Enlightenment must have been quite exciting.

But this excitement masked certain key problems.

For all of their realism and so-called common sense, the philosophes tended to be quite unrealistic about human nature. For them, part of their liberation from mankind meant liberating them from their sense of sin. “You’re not bad, just ignorant!” But in severing people from their sense of sin they dehumanized them. We know we sin, and we know that it is part of being human to sin. To say that sin doesn’t exist makes us less responsible, and if we are less responsible, we are less human. Again, Enlightenment thinkers surely thought they were doing mankind a favor by removing the idea of punishment for sin. I want the students to appreciate the Enlightenment’s strengths, but the tragic irony of the Enlightenment is while they sought to liberate they set us on a path of potential slavery. We deserve to be held responsible for sin because we are human beings responsible for our actions. Dogs are not responsible for their actions. C.S. Lewis elaborates on this in his essay “The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment.”

The Enlightenment frowned on mystery. We know that many key doctrines of Christianity are mysteries at heart, but what about other areas? Is not life itself mysterious? What about love? Guys, what about women? Again, to be fully human we must have a sense of mystery about our existence. In its eagerness to redress an imbalance, the Enlightenment abandoned “truth in tension” and created other kinds of problems, some worse than those it fixed.

The ironic tragedy of the Enlightenment is that while they sought to liberate, they ended up dehumanizing people on a path to slavery, for dehumanization is the first step towards control. One sees this in subtle ways in the “Smile of Reason” in many philosophe portrayals:

The constant tight-lipped smile of these reasonable, agreeable people tips the hand of the Enlightenment. As Clarke notes, the philosophes might smile, but never laugh. They restricted what it meant to be human. Life can be enjoyed, but only in moderation. They prized control above all else.

I don’t want to overreach, but the Enlightenment insistence on control paved the way for some of the tyrannies of the French Revolution and beyond. The Enlightenment gave us good things to be sure. No doubt many good Christians made the best of what the Enlightenment had to offer. But its legacy, like all heresies, continues to haunt us.

Blessings,

Dave

11th/12th Grade: The Battleground of Democratic Ideas

Mar18 by Dave Mathwin

Greetings,

This year we have examined how democracies function across time and space. What do they do well? What challenges put great stress upon them? Are their paths that democracies generally take that they should always avoid? Under the umbrella of these big picture questions, we begin the year looking at the French-Algerian War from 1954-62.

I chose this conflict to study for a variety of reasons:

The conflict is a recent example of a western democratic power fighting both against and amongst Moslems
The conflict is far enough removed from us to allow objective analysis, and to allow us to see its ripple effects
The French dealt with many similar issues as we currently do in Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent, Iraq (such as the use of torture, attempts to win over local populations, etc.)
The excellent movie (based largely in actual events) The Battle of Algiers is a great tie-in to our study

We introduced a few key background concepts before delving into the main events.

1. Why did France feel the absolute need to win in Algeria?

From the time of Charlemagne (or perhaps even dating back to the pre-Romanized Gauls) France was regarded as having the world’s pre-eminent military, from the Charlemagne, the Crusades, to Joan of Arc, to Napoleon. In W.W. I they fought heroically and with great determination. In 1940, however, they suffered a humiliating and shockingly quick defeat to the Nazi’s. Desperately seeking to regain their pre-war glory, they did not give up their colonies (unlike their friendly rival England). They lost again in humiliating fashion in 1954 in Southeast Asia — but they would not lose in Algeria. This was where they would prove to the world that France was still France after all.

The French began colonizing Algeria as far back as 1830, and over time millions of French had come to live there. As France’s reputation declined in the post-W.W. II years, Algeria became the place where they staked their reputation as a nation “good for the world.” France was still France after all, a bastion of liberty and democratic, western ideals. Algeria would be their proving ground. They would bring the blessings of their civilization to North Africa. They would show how Moslems could prosper in a western context. Many other European powers shed their colonial empires after W.W. II. France left S.E. Asia with their tails between their legs. They granted independence to a few other colonies. But not Algeria. Algeria would be different. Algeria would prove the validity of western ideals across cultures and the globe.

We shall see how this psychological and cultural attitude influenced how they fought

2. What is the battleground in an insurgent campaign?

As a modern “First-World” country, the French could easily outspend and outmuscle the Algerians who opposed them. The Algerians naturally quickly turned to guerilla tactics. It seems clear that the French thought that the battle was against the insurgents primarily, and so put their military foot forward almost exclusively.

Why did this fail? What is the primary battleground in an insurgent campaign? Is it the people, or is it an idea? If so, what role can the military play? What role does the government and people play? In our discussion, one student suggested that the only way France could have saved its position in Algeria was through lots of apologies for their poor treatment of them, and lots of financial and social programs to rectify the situation. In other words, was the problem a military one at all?

Well, it certainly might have been. But there is a difference between ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics.’ In large measure,* France’s problem was that their use of the military was their strategy. It was not used as a ‘tactic’ in a broader campaign.

How does an army battle an idea? As one student suggested last year, the only way to do defeat an idea is to have a better one. Did the French, in fact, have a better idea? If they did, how did they present it?

3. What happens when an army fights in disconnected way from its country’s values?

There is a great deal of evidence that French troops tortured and killed some prisoners as a matter of policy. This was done with the tacit approval of French politicians, but not the French people. As revelations of the torture emerged, the French public began to turn against the war, feeling betrayed by the army. The army in turn felt betrayed by the people. This tension between identity and actions needed resolution in some way — and the result was one successful military coup that put De Gaulle in as president, and another coup attempt that failed to get De Gaulle out of power a few years later.

Why are cultural and political values an important ‘weapon’ in a war? Under what circumstances can we depart from those values? How is a country’s identity a part of its strategy in conflict?

4. Related to #3, what should the role of the press be in a free society?

Next week we will discuss a few different options related to this question. Opinions differ. . .

Some say the press should be an entirely objective entity, focused on presenting ‘just the facts.’ But, however much of an ideal this is, it is rarely, if ever attained.
Others argue that the press should be an implicit supporter of the government, or the majority. This does not mean ignoring obvious truths, but it would mean using the press as a means to ‘rally the people.’
Still others assert that the press should be oriented ‘against’ the government. That is, the press’ main function is to provide an alternate viewpoint apart from the government’s message. The government gets its chance, the press provides the people with ‘the other side of the story.’

This week we watched and discussed The Battle of Algiers. Our discussion and analysis of it will help form the basis of our own insurgency game coming up in a couple of weeks.

Here is the preview for the movie, which is also available (I believe) to watch in full on You Tube.

Sincerely,

Dave Mathwin

*France did attempt some small scale political reforms, but almost everyone viewed it as ‘too little, too late.’

A Stick in the Mud

A Classical-Christian History Teacher Seeks Help

Author Archives: Dave Mathwin

The Diary of a Napoleonic Foot Soldier

Napoleon on Napoleon

Napoleon Dynamite

Ritual, Politics, and Power

The Tactics of Religious Revolution

9th/10th Grade: From Reality to Image

Festivals of the French Revolution

“The Sword and the Olive”

9th/10th Grade: The Gods Athirst

9th/10th Grade: The Inevitability of Revolutionary Violence?

9th/10th Grade: Romanticism

Language as Myth

Tribal Bureaucracy

9th/10th Grade: Truth Without Tension

11th/12th Grade: The Battleground of Democratic Ideas