Greetings to all,
This week we examined one of the more studied insurgency campaigns, Algeria’s ultimately successful bid to get independence from France from 1954-1962. I wanted to focus on a few main issues, aided by our watching of ‘The Battle of Algiers.’
1. Why did France feel the absolute need to win in Algeria?
From the time of Charlemagne (or perhaps even dating back to the pre-Romanized Gauls) France was regarded as having the world’s pre-eminent military, from the Crusades, to Joan of Arc, to Napoleon. In W.W. I they fought heroically and with great determination. In 1940, however, they suffered a humiliating and shockingly quick defeat to the Nazi’s. Desperately seeking to regain their pre-war glory, they did not give up their colonies (unlike their friendly rival England). They lost again in humiliating fashion in 1954 in Southeast Asia — but they would not lose in Algeria. This was where they would prove to the world that France was still France after all.
How might this psychological and cultural attitude have impacted their strategy and tactics against the insurgency, and was this beneficial?
2. What is the battleground in an insurgent campaign?
It seems clear that the French thought that the battle was against the insurgents primarily, and so put their military foot forward almost exclusively. Why did this fail? What is the primary battleground in an insurgent campaign? Is it the people, or is it an idea? If so, what role can the military play? What role does the government and people play? In our discussion, one student suggested that the only way France could have saved its position in Algeria was through lots of apologies for their poor treatment of them, and lots of financial and social programs to rectify the situation. In other words, was the problem a military one at all?
Well, it certainly might have been. But there is a difference between ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics.’ In large measure,* France’s problem was that their use of the military was their strategy. It was not used as a ‘tactic’ in a broader campaign.
3. What happens when an army fights in disconnected way from its country’s values?
There is a great deal of evidence that French troops tortured and killed some prisoners as a matter of policy. This was done with the tacit approval of French politicians, but not the French people. As revelations of the torture emerged, the French public began to turn against the war, feeling betrayed by the army. The army in turn felt betrayed by the people. This tension between identity and actions needed resolution in some way — and the result was one successful military coup that put De Gaulle in as president, and another coup attempt that failed to get De Gaulle out of power a few years later.
Why are cultural and political values an important ‘weapon’ in a war? Under what circumstances can we depart from those values? How is a country’s identity a part of its strategy in conflict?
4. Related to #3, what should the role of the press be in a free society?
We discussed a few different options related to this question.
– The press should be an entirely objective entity, focused on presenting ‘just the facts.’ But, however much of an ideal this is, it is rarely, if ever attained.
– The press should be an implicit supporter of the government, or the majority. This does not mean ignoring obvious truths, but it would mean using the press as a means to ‘rally the people.’
– The press should be oriented ‘against’ the government. That is, the press’ main function is to provide an alternate viewpoint apart from the government’s message. The government gets its chance, the press provides the people with ‘the other side of the story.’
Students took a variety of positions and tried to combine some of them as well. We agreed that the current situation is both better and worse than it was 20 years ago. Better in that we have many different options readily available to us, worse in that it can be challenging to sift through the competing perspectives and narratives.
Next week we will look at our current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and also begin to prepare for our own ‘insurgency.’
*France did attempt some small scale political reforms, but almost everyone viewed it as ‘too little, too late.’