This week we continued our look at the Vietnam war. The fall of South Vietnam has many causes, but given our limited time with this period, we need to try and find the “core” of why our policies and military intervention failed to prevent North Vietnam from absorbing South Vietnam.

Machiavelli’s speciality involves viewing different events through a few key principles, one of them involving how states get created and how people come to rule them.

He writes,

Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand simply upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them — two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which are born and grow rapidly, cannot have their foundations and relations with other states fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid before they became princes, they must lay afterwards. 

Machiavelli goes on to cite examples of men who gain power through nepotism, such as Cesare Borgia, who demonstrated enormous energy and creative drive. Borgia had the respect of some, and the fear of most. He had many successes. And yet, as Machiavelli notes, even a man of such ability as Borgia had his power eroded almost the moment his father died. If Cesare Borgia failed, we can count on almost everyone failing in some way in such a position.

We will understand Machiavelli better if we understand his terminology, especially the word “Fortune.” For example, a person might get into Harvard not because of their achievements but because of a large contribution from their parents. A king might place his favorite in charge of a conquered province, regardless of his connection to the people there or his experience. All this would be an example of Fortune at work.

Very few places in Machiavelli’s day made political decisions via elections, so his advice may seem outdated. But if by “princes” we take “rulers” more generally that will help us understand his words more clearly.

When looking at South Vietnam, we should first realize that in many ways, the state was created by “Fortune” artificially. True, the Vietnamese people had existed for centuries, and Vietnam as a region had existed for centuries. But after the French lost control of what was then called Indochina in 1954, Vietnam was partitioned into North and South Vietnam by treaty. The US had a heavy hand in making sure this happened, and we had good reasons for doing so. We wanted to stop the spread of communism, for one (the North was basically communist controlled) and we wanted to preserve the long southern coastline for shipping, trade, and other security reasons. But South Vietnam was essentially created by “Fortune” and its president, Ngo Diem, was in power at least partly due to our influence.

Machiavelli would have said that the fall of South Vietnam 1975 had a lot to do with the circumstances of its founding in 1954. It would have taken extraordinary leadership to overcome the inherent problems involved in its somewhat artificial creation. Unfortunately, President Diem displayed some of the worst characteristics of leaders created by Fortune.

To be fair to Diem, he was an intelligent man and a staunch anti-communist. He likely also held sincere Christian beliefs. He had a real desire to see South Vietnam succeed. He showed courage in the war for independence from the French, for in eschewing both communism and colonialism, he made himself vulnerable to reprisals from both parties. He wanted a democratic Vietnam, and had well thought out ideas of how to map democracy onto Vietnamese culture and history.

Having said this, many leaders created by Fortune can forget that they did not truly earn their position. This can lead them to overconfidence, which in turn leads them to isolate themselves from the populace.* Diem made several missteps, among them

• He was a Catholic in a largely Buddhist part of Vietnam. Historians debate the nature of his treatment of Buddhists as democratic equals, but his policies towards them failed to connect. Eventually, he ended up cracking down on the civil liberties of Buddhists.
• He held elections, but almost certainly rigged them in his favor, or at least, significantly exaggerated the extent of his winning margins.
• He practiced nepotism, giving family members key governmental posts. If these family members had great ability, this could have mitigated the political cost of nepotism. As it was, his family members were corrupt and unstable. One of his brothers, for example, was a professed admirer of Hitler.

When the US finally decided to withdraw its support of Diem in 1963, a successful coup attempt happened almost immediately. But one coup can lead to another, and South Vietnam never again had a stable government. After hearing about the coup Ho Chi Minh, the leader of North Vietnam, reportedly stated that, “I can hardly believe the Americans would be so stupid.” The North Vietnamese government wrote that,

The consequences of the 1 November coup d’état will be contrary to the calculations of the US imperialists … Diệm was one of the strongest individuals resisting the people and Communism. Everything that could be done in an attempt to crush the revolution was carried out by Diệm. Diệm was one of the most competent lackeys of the US imperialists. Among the anti-Communists in South Vietnam or exiled in other countries, no one has sufficient political assets and abilities to cause others to obey. Therefore, the lackey administration cannot be stabilized. The coup d’état on 1 November 1963 will not be the last.

Indeed, this unfortunately proved prescient. South Vietnam experienced many other changes in leadership over the next several years, and no regime ever had anything like stability. In such an environment, American military efforts were akin to pouring water into a sieve. South Vietnam crumbled as the US inevitably withdrew its support, and US culture crumbled as well, with the domestic and foreign scene mirroring each other in some ways.

Dave

*The story of South Vietnam partially foreshadows what happened in Afghanistan in 2001-2020. Our invasion helped install Hamid Karzai in power, and he began his term in office with significant international acclaim and support. Based on my very limited knowledge it seems to me he was a better leader than Diem, and smarter about how he tried to unite different factions. Karzai was intelligent and courageous. In time, however, his relationship with the U.S. soured, and he was accused of corruption from different facets of the Afghan and international community. Afghanistan could not maintain the momentum of the early 2000’s, and in time the Taliban returned. This quasi-democratic interregnum lasted about 20 years, roughly the same amount of time South Vietnam existed.