Greetings Everyone,

Having spent much of the year with 20th century history, Aristotle, and Machiavelli, we now shift our focus (without leaving either of them entirely behind) to our own Constitution and how it functions. The ‘tent pole’ related to this will be an extensive activity related to how our system of government works, and how our founders conceived of how democracy should best function.

Living 250 years after the fact, we take certain things about America for granted. Having lived with the same Constitution and the same general ideas for so long, we can imagine that such things are simply part of the structure of the universe at some level. In fact, many key concepts about the Constitution were radical for its time, and the founders saw it that way. America would be, and perhaps still is, an experiment whose final results may be undecided.

In the late 18th century, the main prevailing idea about democracy and republican government involved two key assumptions:

• Democracies can work, but only within communities that are essentially homogenous, where people know each other and trust is high. Too much diversity within a community would create the need for a strong centralized state to hold people together, which was antithetical to democracy.
• Plato thought the ideal size of the city should be 5000. Aristotle avoided choosing one fixed number, but thought that a large city of, for example, 100,000 people would be ungovernable. Other subsequent political thinkers thought likewise. All agreed that large republics would lead to the breakdown of democracy. The example of Rome proved this. The collapse of the Republic between 133-31 BC had many factors, but their overseas expansion into Africa and other parts of the Mediterranean certainly contributed.

Many often dismiss Plato as an impractical idealist, and some of his thought may deserve this. However, in his section of The Laws where he argues for the right size of the city, he makes the salient points that

• We cannot rightly choose leaders if we have no way of actually knowing them
• Communities are built first on trust, not law, and we cannot trust each other without having the possibility of knowing one another.
• A community must have a “center,” which binds both in a spiritual/cultural manner and in a physical manner. This geographic center (usually a religious site) needs to be easily accessible to all for the community to function.
• The larger the community, the more opportunity for variation exists. In a small community, differences between the wealth of each citizen would likely be moderate. But in a bigger community, with greater variation introduced, those differences would grow. In Beverly Hills, some houses are bigger than others, but everyone has a nice house. In a poorer area, houses are not as nice but everyone’s house is equally not as nice. If you combined Beverly Hills with poorer areas together, then you would have a problem.*

A more contemporary political writer admired by the founders was the French judge Charles Secondat Montesquieu,wrote in his Spirit of the Laws that

It is natural for a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist. In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single subject; he has interests of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious, by oppressing his fellow-citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country.

In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have less extent, and, of course, are less protected.

In the aftermath of the American Revolution, the different states had to decide how they would exist together. Combining would create a huge country, and every prominent thinker in every state knew political theory. Creating a government with greater central unity would have advantages, but could democracy survive the size and diversity of the country? Many had grave doubts.*

After the creation of the Constitution in 1787, each state hotly debated its merits. Many prominent revolutionaries (such as Virginia’s Patrick Henry) opposed its ratification. This led to James Madison and Alexander Hamilton (with an occasional assist from John Jay) to write a series of essays now known as the Federalist Papers, which made the case for the Constitution to the public at large.

James Madison wrote two of the more famous essays (#10, #51) that tackle the problem of large republics. In these essays, Madison ingeniously (though controversially) turns the problem of large republics on its head and attempts to flip the script. Madison begins by identifying faction as the key enemy of democracy. A “faction” comprises a group of people within the state who combine to act adversely to the public interest. An example might be a group that wants to pass a law imposing an extra tax on everyone with red hair. Such a law would obviously unfairly benefit the general population at the expense of a few.

Madison admits that given the fact that

• Democracies allow for people to be different and believe different things, and
• People are naturally selfish and unreasonable,

factions will inevitably exist. What to about them? We could either eliminate them or control their effects, i.e., limit the damage they cause. To eliminate them would mean refusing the population liberty and creatings stifling centralized governement. The cure would be worse than the disease.

The other option involves controlling their effects, and here Madison ingeniously and controversially flips the script. He argues that, in fact, a large republic can better control factions. In a small population, if the “tax the red haired people” faction comprised a majority in a small city, the faction would prevail. But that same faction would represent only a small part of a larger population and would pose no real threat to governance.

Of course, other factions would exist, some of them just as pernicious or worse. But the multiplicity of factions spread out over a significant area would end up canceling each other out. The large geography and the large population would act like water, which moderates the extremes of temperature.

One has to admire Madison’s audacity and ingenuity. The question remains–was he correct? One can reasonably answer the question in the following ways:

• Madison was correct because we are still here 250 years later. We still have our Constitution and regular federal and state elections. We have had issues, bumps, and bruises but those are inevitable in any case.
• Yes, Madison was right for his time but given our situation, his idea fails to land. Madison could not have foreseen the advent of mass media, which changes the equation. Mass media allows for the formation of a national consciousness and hence, nation-sized factions. We have seen factions take over and destroy both Germany and Japan in the 20th century, with the Nazi Party and a military dictatorship, respectively. One could argue that a faction ruled Russia/Soviet Union for nearly 75 years.
• No, Madison was wrong. He had a brilliantly inventive idea, but one that simply was not correct. We have had continual problems with trying to live out a national life with a large republic. We barely survived the election of 1800. We had the Trail of Tears, the Nullification Crisis, the Civil War, Jim Crow laws, COVID controversies, etc. Aristotle and Plato were correct–a large republic creates too many problems, regardless of the presence of mass media or not. We would be better off with thousands of different smaller communities scattered throughout the continent.

Whatever one might think of Madison’s ideas, we should realize that our founders conceived of America as an experiment that might not work, and that each succeeding generation has to maintain the delicate balance required to keep a republic.

Dave

*Plato thinks faction is a problem, but believes that distraction is the biggest problem a state can face, and he relates this to the disparity of wealth that can exist between citizens. He writes,

The form of law which I should propose as the natural sequel would be as follows:-In a state which is desirous of being saved from the greatest of all plagues-not faction, but rather distraction;-here should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty, nor, again, excess of wealth, for both are productive of both these evils. Now the legislator should determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth. Let the limit of poverty be the value of the lot; this ought to be preserved, and no ruler, nor any one else who aspires after a reputation for virtue, will allow the lot to be impaired in any case. This the legislator gives as a measure, and he will permit a man to acquire double or triple, or as much as four times the amount of this. But if a person have yet greater riches, whether he has found them, or they have been given to him, or he has made them in business, or has acquired by any stroke of fortune that which is in excess of the measure, if he give back the surplus to the state, and to the Gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no penalty or loss of reputation; but if he disobeys this our law any one who likes may inform against him and receive half the value of the excess, and the delinquent shall pay a sum equal to the excess out of his own property, and the other half of the excess shall belong to the Gods. And let every possession of every man, with the exception of the lot, be publicly registered before the magistrates whom the law appoints, so that all suits about money may be easy and quite simple.