This week in Civics class we looked at our support of the Afghan insurgency during the 1980’s. Next week the students will be involved in a big project where they have to decide why, when, and how to support the Afghan soldiers against the Soviet invasion, but we started by looking at Machiavelli’s thoughts on auxiliary and mercenary troops.

Machiavelli has harsh words for rulers who rely on mercenaries, but to the suprise of many, he had even more reservations about the use of auxiliary troops.

He begins chapter 13 of The Prince writing,

Auxiliary armies – that is, when you ask a powerful ruler to send military help to defend your town – are likewise useless.

Auxiliaries may be efficient and useful when it comes to achieving their own ends, but they are almost always counterproductive for those who invite them in, because if they lose, you lose too, and if they win, you are at their mercy.

To fight his neighbours, the emperor of Constantinople brought 10,000 Turks into Greece and when the war was over they wouldn’t leave, which was how the infidels began to get control of Greece.

So anyone looking for a no-win situation should turn to auxiliaries, because they are far more dangerous even than mercenaries. With auxiliaries your ruin is guaranteed: they are a tightly knit force and every one of them obedient to someone else; when mercenaries win they need time and a convenient opportunity before they can attack you, if only because they’re not a solid united force, you chose them, you’re paying them, and hence it will take the man you put in command a while to build up sufficient authority to turn against you. To summarize, the big danger with mercenaries is their indecision, with auxiliaries their determination.

Mercenary troops are only in it for the money. They are expensive, and cannot be relied upon. They have no investment in the cause and hence cannot be relied upon to fight with any real spirit. But still, because

• You pay them, and
• You created them

they lack organization and direction apart from you. They won’t help you much, but neither will they hurt you either, aside from your checkbook.

Auxiliaries are a different category.

• They exist independently of you, directly accountable to others, not yourself
• They have their own ideas, agendas, etc.
• They have cohesion and can fight well

You won’t have to pay auxiliaries, at least not directly. They have much greater fighting capability than mercenaries. But, you are playing with fire. You may travel together for a time, but in supporting them, you may be nurturing a monster that could later turn on you.

Machiavelli mentions another possibility with the use of auxiliaries later in the chapter, writing,

When, with luck and good leadership, Charles VII, Louis XI’s father, had pushed the English out of France, he saw that a ruler needs his own troops and so set up a standing army of both cavalry and infantry. Later, his son Louis disbanded the infantry and began to hire Swiss mercenaries. It’s now plain that this mistake, together with others that followed, is what lies behind France’s present troubles. By giving this important role to the Swiss, Louis had weakened his whole army, since, with no infantry of their own, his cavalry were now relying on others, and once they’d got used to fighting alongside the Swiss they started to think they couldn’t win without them. As a result the French are unable to take on the Swiss in battle and won’t fight anyone else without their help. So French forces are now mixed, part mercenary and part their own men. Such composite forces are much better than just auxiliaries or just mercen- aries, but much worse than having all your own men. France’s situation proves the point, because if the standing army Charles recruited had been reinforced or just maintained, the French would be unbeatable. But men are so thoughtless they’ll opt for a diet that tastes good without realizing there’s a hidden poison in it.

In this case, the use of auxiliaries weakens yourself. You grow too soft, figuring that others can handle the hard things.

There are a variety of examples of both principles. Here I will just cite two:

• As to the first principle, in WW II we used and nurtured the Soviet army. It was quite weak even in 1941. But they initiated internal reforms and got a lot of aid and supplies from England and the United States. By 1943, the Soviets turned things around decisively. By 1945, they were an exceedingly formidable army that crushed the Germans. No question–England and the United States were aided tremendously by the Soviets in the fight against Germany. One can definitely claim that the Soviets had more to do with the defeat of Germany than England or the U.S. Even before the war ended, the Soviets began occupying territory and opposing us. It took the better part of the next four decades to defeat them.
• As to the second, in the post World War II world, much of Europe has in fact used the United States military as “auxiliaries.” Countries such as Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, etc. have armies of their own, but they are essentially ornamental. Rightly or wrongly, much of Europe opposes aspects of our foreign policy but they have no means of opposing it effectively, as they have no means of acting independently in a military manner.

Machiavelli makes his point about self-reliance referencing a famous biblical story:

I’d also like to bring in a parable from the Old Testament. When David offered to go and fight the Philistine trouble- maker, Goliath, on Saul’s behalf, Saul gave him his own weapons to bolster the boy’s courage. But no sooner had David put them on than he refused the gift, saying he wouldn’t feel confident with them, he would rather face the enemy with his own sling and knife. In the end, other people’s arms are either too loose, too heavy or too tight.

This brings us to our decision in the mid-80’s to support the Afghan insurgents against the Soviet invasion of their country.

On its face, this seemed like a simple decision for a few reasons:

• While Soviet control of Afghanistan in itself would not have given the USSR much of a strategic gain, Afghanistan does border other countries of crucial strategic value like India and Pakistan. It was reasonable for the US to conclude that we should prevent the Soviets from winning in Afghanistan.
• However, we did not want to fight in Afghanistan ourselves, because of a lack of political will to send our own troops, and our understandable reluctance to directly engage the Soviets with the prospect of nuclear weapons lingering over the Cold War.
• Given the terrain of the country, and the fighting spirit of the people, guerrilla tactics in mountainous regions seemed like an ideal strategy.

• However, with the use of attack helicopters, the Soviets effectively could counter this high ground advantage, as the insurgents had no effective weapon against them.

A variety of intelligence analysts concluced that with a compartively small expenditure, we could decisively turn the war against the Soviets by provided the Afghan fighters with missile launchers and high powered sniper rifles. We were correct. Our cash, weapons, and training helped deal the USSR a decisive blow in Afghanistan. Many believe that their failure in Afghanistan helped lead to the collapse of the communist regime and the end of the Cold War.

However . . .

Our support of the Afghan insurgents unfortunately matches up with all the reasons why Machiavelli cautions against using auxiliary armies to help achieve your own ends. To recap, auxiliaries

• Have their own agenda which may differ radically from yours
• You have little to no control over their actions, and they have the internal strength and will to pursue their own goals
• Your aid to them makes them stronger

Many of those we aided in the 1980’s used the weapons and training to take over the country themselves after the Soviets left. The strongest of these forces proved to be the Taliban, who then gave aid to terrorist groups such as Al-Queada, who attacked us on 9-11. Machiavelli’s pattern and prediction came true.

We later went back to Afghanistan ourselves in a mirror image of the Soviet invasion in the 1980’s. Like the Soviets, while we had a great deal of tactical success over many years, we could not achieve a strategic victory in the final analysis.

In the end, Machiavelli’s insistence that one do things themselves, or not at all, has much to commend it.