The modern history of Israel poses many questions, their 65 years lived at breakneck speed have given us many lessons. But the questions about their state, the Palestinians, their neighbors, and so on are enormously complex. Some historians seek to tackle all aspects of the problem but books of that nature can often be too long, heavy on details, weak on conclusions, leaving readers with no clear answers and no path to discover them on their own.
With problems of this sort, I tend to think that books that focus on one particular aspect of the issues often serve readers better than all-encompassing tomes. The narrowness of focus makes no pretense to answer every question, but it can provide a clear narrative arc, and thus give definite shape to at least some of the puzzle pieces. Martin van Creveld’s The Sword and the Olive fulfills this purpose, much like Byron Farwell’s The Armies of the Raj. Creveld does not tackle the broader “should” questions (i.e. should Israel have been given ‘x’ land, should they occupy the West Bank, etc.), but traces the effects of various decisions nicely in this history of the Israeli army.
While various militarized Zionist groups long predated W.W. II, the Israeli army takes as its main starting point the formation of the state. Early on Creveld introduces one of his main themes, that the trauma of the Holocaust created a moral weight to the Jewish cause. This in turn formed a social cohesion that enabled an army to achieve near mythical status within a few short years. Creveld lives in Israel and I assume is Jewish himself, but he attempts no sugarcoating of either Jews, Palestinians, or Arabs. His seeks to show, however, that whatever the strength of Palestinian claims, the Jews simply had stronger ones in the immediate context of the post-war years. When Palestine lingered under lame-duck British authority thousands of Jewish immigrants poured illegally into Palestine and settled beyond established boundaries. These illegal settlements received protection from Jewish militias. The British discovered that sometimes the strong must suffer the actions of the weak. How could the British enforce their authority and detain/fire upon people with numbered tattoos on their arms from Auschwitz in 1947? Every British “victory” over Jewish militias only made their position more and more untenable.
The story of the “War for Independence” in 1948 had a similar theme. Palestinians outnumbered Jews but tended to spread out in rural areas, whereas Jews settled in mostly urban areas and therefore had a more formal political structure. The countries that attacked Israel shared few common goals and even had some conflicting ones. The psychological sense of mission and purpose gave Israel a great army. As Napoleon remarked, “In war the moral is to the physical as three is to one.”
Israel was a democracy in many ways, but their initial victory helped lead to some generally non-democratic ideas.
- Democracies at least like to think of themselves as defensive in nature, and so did Israel. But the nature of their geography led to a sense of being continually under siege. In war, they developed a “strike-first” mentality — war must always be fought on the enemies territory. They would have ironically agreed with the Prussian Frederick the Great’s motto of “Audacity, audacity, and still more audacity!” Even more ironically, this led Israel to develop tactics that strongly resembled the blitzkrieg of 1939-41.
- As De Tocqueville noted, most democracies have a generally ambivalent attitude toward the army, but not Israel. After 1948, and especially after 1967, the army had near god-like status within the state. This led to a political structure where the army had very little official civilian oversight, and even less in practical terms.
- The sense of unity had to do with their circumstances, but also perhaps due to the settling of Israel by many eastern-European Jews with socialist leanings. In any case, Israel quickly developed strong censorship laws with anything to do with security. They deemed this necessary given that they felt alone not only where they stood geographically, but also in the international arena. The Holocaust showed that the world would abandon Jews if it suited them. The media helped develop these laws. But democracies are also open societies, so usually censors had the job of keeping Israeli’s ignorant of what everyone else around the world knew.
Some of these contradictions would have to work themselves out at some point.
The psychological and moral factors of the post-war years created a juggernaut military with sky high morale. But Israel’s very success would help to change this dynamic. Occupying more territory meant the need to increase the size of the army. This in turn meant more recruits, and the social cohesion that once characterized the army — an army where everyone knew everyone else — began to erode. An army with a civilian-militia ethos turned professional. Israel condensed about 200 years of Roman history (ca. 202-27 B.C.) into about 20 of their own.
Israel soon developed a much stronger military than their neighbors, but they kept their siege mentality. This meant that when they engaged the PLO in the 1970’s, and especially in Lebanon in the early 1980’s, that the strong/weak dynamic that had served them so well psychologically had now flipped against them. They were now strong and secure, their enemies had “weakness” on their side. The “us against the world” attitude that served them so well now fought against them. Now Israel faced an identity crisis. What would they do with success? Bold, aggressive, and occasional “outside the lines” actions could be tolerated and even expected when “fighting for one’s life.” But they did not get the same pass under these new circumstances. No one thought that PLO hideouts within Lebanon posed anything more than a nuisance to the state. As Creveld commented, the strong should never fight the weak for very long. Lao-Tsu noted similarly that a sword thrust into sea-water turns to rust.
The unquestioning public support that the military enjoyed for so many years now eroded, and this led to erosion within the army itself. Their war in Lebanon had far fewer casualties and far less real fighting than their previous wars, but the number of psychological maladies effecting soldiers skyrocketed, as did the number of civilians who refused to serve, or found medical exemptions for their service. The power of the government to investigate the military increased, albeit only slightly. Certainly soldiers no longer wore their uniforms off-duty, as once was common.
The Israeli army today still maintains a high level of professional competence and tactical superiority over its neighbors, but they unquestionably lost something of the soul of the army. And because Israel made the army such a integral part of their identity, something in Israel itself has no doubt been lost as well. What Vietnam was for us, Lebanon was for them. If our experience proves any kind of mirror, they can recover some of what they lost, but Israel will not be able to go home again. The golden age of the Israeli military has come and gone.