Like many of you I have spent some time wondering where we are as a civilization and how we got here.
It might seem like a book about French historians of the 16th century might have very little to do with this question. But bear with me!–George Huppert’s book The Idea of Perfect History: Historical Erudition and Historical Philosophy in Renaissance France might indeed have something to do with where we find ourselves.
Though perhaps getting there via this informative but slightly dry tome may require more patience from readers than usual!
Huppert makes that point that the writing of history changed dramatically during the period he examines, but to understand this we need to briefly glimpse the history of “History,” for the study of history as we know it came into being comparatively recently.
In the ancient world various kings had their escapades recorded for posterity. A text of the Egyptian pharaoh Thutmose III, for example, has him slaying 1000 lions with a single arrow and other such things. We can wonder, did Thutmose expect others to believe him? Did he believe it himself? More likely, he had no wish to record exactly what happened but inhabited another way of thinking and another form of writing. Herodotus records a combination of personal observations, investigations, and poetic constructions. He saw no need to differentiate. Apparently, he didn’t think it mattered. He saw no need to concern himself with his “history” exclusively with what “actually happened.” Even Thucydides–who had a much more scientific bent and witnessed many of the events he records–surely invents certain speeches to craft an artful narrative.
The medieval period formed the immediate context for many of Huppert’s subjects. Many wrote first-hand accounts of kings or crusades during this period. What they knew and saw they described. But when going beyond this, they no problem filling in gaps with some educated guesswork, and like the ancients, saw no need to be clear about the difference. Others went further. In his History of the Kings of Britain Geoffrey of Monmouth includes a lengthy section on King Arthur. Here Geoffrey is on at least semi-historical footing–King Arthur, or someone like him, may have existed. But Geoffrey includes a section detailing Arthur’s denunciation by senate of Rome, and his combat against a rag-tag army which included “Kings from the Orient,” which certainly never happened. Moreover, Geoffrey and his readers must have known this never happened.
We also see in many medieval histories the desire to connect one’s own particular history with a grander narrative. One can do this with myth directly, but others did this “mythically.” Vergil has the origins of Rome come from Troy, and Geoffrey has the English, in turn, come from Rome/Troy. French historians have the Franks come from Troy as well.* Again, the desire to connect poetically/narratively with the grand story of civilization trumps that of what “actually happened.” They did this quite self-consciously.
Nicole Gilles’ Annals of France (ca. 1525) give us a late example of this. He begins with Creation itself and then recounts some aspects of Biblical history. He moves quickly to the history of France’s kings, but here he includes many legends and miracles. The giants he describes, as well as the kings, have an ancestry. It just so happens in the Annals that the Franks were founded by a man named Francio, . . . also from Troy. Even the giant Feragut, slain by Roland, descends from Goliath. Perhaps Roland and Francio did not exist, but certainly Charlemagne did. But he has Charlemagne do things that few would really think actually happened, such as undertake a crusade to Jerusalem. His book was a wild success, which surely frustrated many of the France’s emerging humanist scholars. Those scholars might have taken solace had they known that the Annals were the last of its kind.
We see the shift evidenced by the comments of two humanist scholars in the mid 16th century. Claude Fauchet wrote that medieval historians had, “failed in the chief responsibility of the historian, that is, to tell the truth.” And Lancelot Popeliniere declared that “no man of honor ever practiced [history in France], since the profession had always been in the hands of clerics,” whose limitations and biases prevented them from giving an objective appraisal of events.
These statements contain within them a revolution of thought, but they both beg questions: What does it mean for a historian to tell the truth? And who is objective?
Their passion for “what really happened” involved the following:
- Making history a science that concerned itself with the affairs of men, not so much the intervention of God, which cannot be measured or predicted.
- Broadening the scope of history beyond national or religious concerns, and focusing on the history of all, and
- Getting the best texts, and staying faithful to the best texts, would get us to the truth. Truth comes from texts, not so much from tradition.
The astute observer no doubt notices a strong correlation between this last goal and the emerging Protestant Reformation. Indeed, some of this new breed of historians had much sympathy with the French Protestants, and we can say more on this later. But regardless of religious affiliation, all three goals also added up to a rejection of the idea that history involved a kind of devolution, a falling away from grace. Rather, for these French humanists, just as we could improve the study of history and cleanse from the muck of the errors of the past, so too could our whole society move forward and progress.**
Huppert details the writing of several French historians of the 16th century who followed these axioms. The details here ran a bit dry for me, but the overall effect was the same. When one combines the work of these scholars in the 16th century with the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century, the work of history changed dramatically, and we should evaluate the fallout for good or ill.
The passion for precision and the value of the text have done a great deal to improve history in a variety of ways that seem axiomatic to mention. We have more access to more information, we have more texts in translation, and almost certainly, a better idea for “what really happened,” than previously. The late Renaissance humanists foreshadowed the Enlightenment, which gave us a variety of other secondary blessings, especially related to advancements in science that comes with breaking things down into component parts.
But we have lost a great deal in the exchange and the exchange may not have worth it.
First, I stress that while we have a “better idea” for what really happened in the past, we still don’t really know. We still have to guess and be comfortable with guessing. Having more texts will not solve the problem of interpreting the texts. But all this says is that the French humanists had a bit too much optimism, hardly a dreadful fault. But this optimism has had certain consequences.
Their methods assert that we can get outside traditions and into a place of pure perspective and rationality. We know that we cannot do this. Their reliance on texts exacerbates this. A text, divorced from tradition, can have an almost infinite amount of interpretations. Note how the reliance on “sola Scriptura” has doomed Protestants into constant splintering and thousands of factions, each claiming to base their ideas on the “text” of the Bible. In the end, different traditions of interpretation do in fact form, with Reformed Study Bibles, Scofield Reference Bibles, and so on.
We must also deal with Geoffrey of Monmouth and Nicole Gilles and ask if they write history. We may say that the discipline of History involves many things, but we must first ask what it involves primarily. Is it primarily an art or science? If we had to choose would we rather have eyewitness testimonies to tell us what happened in Guernica, or Picasso’s painting?
If we side with Picasso we will begin to understand medieval historians.
For History to have any real significance, it must have meaning. Meaning requires interpretation, and interpretation requires poetry, something beyond mere facts. We might surmise that in having Arthur deal with Rome, Geoffrey sought to display his view of Arthur as the inheritor of the mantle of Christendom after the fall of Rome–the literary equivalent to an interpretative painting of him, or perhaps an “icon” of Arthur (a great example of how truth can be communicated in image can be found here). The same could be said of Gilles’ “depiction” of Charlemagne.
We do not critique paintings by saying things such as, “He didn’t look exactly like that, so that’s not painting.” But humanistic rationalism treated the text as having more truth than the image. This is why they treated medieval historians unfairly. They failed to see how truth claims could be communicated in the text artistically (and entertainingly as well, as anyone who has read Geoffrey of Monmouth can attest).^ I have no problem calling Geoffrey and Gilles historians, albeit historians of a different type. They told the “truth,” (if their interpretations were accurate), but in a different way. They had their biases, but so do you and I.
One can point to many reasons why we experience our current political situation. Some of them do indeed have a connection to the historians of Renaissance France. The founders (not the early colonists) drank deeply from the same Enlightenment-oriented spirit of our aforementioned historians. They too focused heavily on texts, and indeed, we base our life together not on shared traditions, but the texts of the Declaration and Constitution. “Not that there’s anything wrong with that!”–but it has certain consequences.
The postmoderns rightly tell us that texts can have an almost uncountable number of interpretations. The search for the “absolute” interpretation of the text will get us nowhere. So both those who drive pickups with big American flags and those who drink latte’s and protest the national anthem both can claim to live out what it means to be an American (i.e., “protest is the most American thing one can do,” and so on). On the one hand, Trump takes an ax to many traditions of how a president should act. But on the other hand, he “connects with the common man,” and isn’t America all about the common man and freedom from tradition?
Hence, we see our dilemma.
But postmoderns fail us because not every interpretation has the same validity. We have to have a way of distinguishing and separating the good from the bad. With only texts and no traditions at our disposal, however, we will have a hard time reigning in the various interpretations. Other ways of seeing and apprehending the “truths” of history can provide checks, balances, and possibly, a return to sanity. In his introduction to Fr. Maximos Constas’ The Art of Seeing Bishop Maxim asks
For example, if you have a photograph of Christ and an icon painting of Christ, which is more truthful? Certainly, if you have a naturalistic approach, you would say, “the photograph.” But if you say [the icon] you point to unconventional and eschatological truth. . . . .Therefore, there is truth in art that does not correspond to the mind of reality.
*I find it interesting that everyone wanted to come from Troy and not Greece. Troy lost. Many say that the Europeans wanted to come from Troy to connect themselves with Rome. I can’t deny this might have something to do with it, but I think it goes beyond that. Hector, for example, became a Christian name, while Odysseus and Achilles did not. I’m sure there is more here to explore.
**The idea that history means speaking of such devolution is hardly the property of medievals alone. Most every ancient society had myths of golden ages in the past we should attempt to emulate, whether these ages be mythical, quasi-mythical, or presented as historical (as perhaps Livy does in his work). What looks benign to us in the French scholars really represented a radical shift from the past.
I consider the idea of devolution in history here.
^I think this attitude towards texts and the reduction of the idea of truth to “what actually happened” contributed greatly to the Galileo controversy and the subsequent tension between science and religion. In my limited reading of the situation, no such tension existed before this time.