In our senior Government class, we spend a good amount of time discussing the question, “What is America?” throughout the year. The question is deceptively simple, and we have a difficult time answering it. We discussed Book 1, Ch. 4 from The Prince recently in class, and it spurred some interesting discussion.
The text reads as follows . . .
Why The Kingdom Of Darius, Conquered By Alexander, Did Not Rebel Against The Successors Of Alexander At His Death
CONSIDERING the difficulties which men have had to hold a newly acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was yet scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from their own ambitions.
I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be governed in two different ways: either by a prince, with a body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular affection.
The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of the prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.
The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity.
Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.
But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were acknowledged.
When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.
Machiavelli’s distinction helps make sense of other historical events. We can look, for example, at Napoleon and Hitler’s invasion of Russia/Soviet Union. At first glance, Russia must have seemed akin to Persia in Napoleon’s eyes. After all, Czar Alexander I certainly looked like most other autocrats in history. But . . . for most of Russia’s existence it resembled France. Tales in the old Russian folk-epics reveal a shaky relationship of the people to their ruler, but more importantly, old Russia had several distinct provinces/cities that competed for precedence and had their own history and identity. Napoleon found Russia easy to enter but hard to hold. The Nazi’s found the same true even 130 years later. When force no longer sufficed to hold the Soviet Union together ca. 1989-91, the old identities resurfaced almost immediately.
“Never get involved in a land war in Asia,” also has some of the same logic behind it. A country like China has the appearance of resembling Persia, just as Russia did. But most of China’s history reveals competing provinces, dialects, and an uncertain relationship to the emperor until later in its existence.
So we asked the question, “Which kind of kingdom is America?” Does it resemble France, or Persia? One clue to this question is to look at Persia. In contrast to Russia, China, or France, did not have a long, zig-zag run-up to the height of its power. Their civilization had a jump-start, meteoric rise under Cyrus the Great, who immediately set a pattern of charismatic dominance over the whole of his empire. In future generations the Persians took their cue it seemed almost entirely from future dynamic leaders like Darius. Their reliance on this pattern shows even in the failed rebellion of Cyrus the Younger, who fit this mold of dynamic leader better than his brother Artaxerxes II. The fact that he almost succeeded with no other claim to rule besides his personality says a lot about Persia.
Some students thought that America had a beginning akin to that of France or Russia. We had different colonies in different parts of the Atlantic coast that developed entirely apart from each other. These colonies came together only to fight against a common enemy, but essentially remained separate kingdoms until sometime after the Civil War — perhaps not even until into the Great Depression.
The majority thought otherwise. True, the first colonies hardly interacted with one another, but they came to America with similar purposes from similar cultures. At the core, they were about the same thing, which is why the French-Indian War could so easily unite them and start us thinking about the “people.” When examining the history of China, Russia, or France one sees a host of regularly occurring rivalries, small conflicts, and so on. But America we only see one big blowup — the Civil War. The Civil War showed that obviously, we differed on much. But it was the kind of big blowup that occurs in families, when often unity exists. It was the exception that proved the rule.
I acknowledge much merit in the “France” argument, but in this case I sided with the majority. Tocqueville noticed back in the 1830’s the tendency towards centralization in our democratic experiment, and the already growing power of the majority. He wrote,
The very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority; for there is nothing in democratic states that is capable of resisting it.
We have different political opinions, but in no political election is any fundamental question of identity at stake. Many rejoice/lament the election of a particular president. But whoever may win the election, the next day our lives remain unchanged.
In Book Five of his Poliitcs Aristotle speculates that democratic constitutions* remain most safest when threats to said constitution remain either far away or very close. The first seems obvious. When nothing threatens us we live at ease, and it’s easy to have peace with others. A very near threat like an invasion would bind us together quickly. This kind of threat might also be merely an obvious one, like the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which immediately united a divided country in the war effort.
The in-between threats, however, pose a real challenge. Since the danger is neither obvious or near, we can easily divide not just on how to respond but whether or not to respond. We might think of the Vietnam War as an example of this, and sure enough, it brought on significant internal changes to our constitution. The “War on Terror” fits into a similar mold. Should we intervene here or there? Should we increase surveillance or not, what about privacy rights, and so on. And, true to Aristotle’s form, we see increased political polarization with this “intermediate” threat.
But our class speculated on exactly what an “invader” — whatever form that might take — would find. Once Cyrus the Younger died in the Battle of Cunaxa his cause died with him. Once Darius III died, Alexander had essentially conquered Persia. But at what would America’s enemies take aim? Not the president, surely, for at any given time half the country will not like him. Not the capital, either. As the British discovered in 1813, burning D.C. did little to aid their war effort. One could hypothetically detonate a strong EMP in the atmosphere to knock out our electrical system. But that would take out any first or second world country and so that answer lacks enough specificity to the United States. This “absolute sovereignty of the majority,” would be hard to pin down. Where is it? And how would one attack it? Get too close, and the unity of the people to defend their “constitution” would quickly emerge.
The “prestige” in magic is the trick’s big reveal, and of course sometimes what is revealed is nothing at all. This would happen perhaps to an invader, who might never find the rabbit inside the hat. Rather, as Aristotle suggests, and the experience of Rome certainly plays out, democracies will be far more likely to erode themselves from within as opposed to without.
*By “constitution” he does not mean merely a written document, but our way of relating to one another in general.